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Abstract
In this work, we abstract some key ingredients in previous LWE- and RLWE-based key
exchange protocols, by introducing and formalizing the building tool, referred to as key con-
sensus (KC) and its asymmetric variant AKC. KC and AKC allow two communicating parties
to reach consensus from close values obtained by some secure information exchange. We then
discover upper bounds on parameters for any KC and AKC, which bounds what could or
couldn’t be done for the various parameters involved. KC and AKC are fundamental to lat-
tice based cryptography, in the sense that a list of cryptographic primitives based on LWR,
LWE and RLWE (including key exchange, public-key encryption, and more) can be modu-
larly constructed from them. As a conceptual contribution, this much simplifies the design
and analysis of these cryptosystems in the future.
We then design and analyze both general and almost optimal KC and AKC schemes, which
are referred to as OKCN and AKCN respectively for presentation simplicity. Based on KC
and AKC, we present generic constructions of key exchange from LWR, LWE and RLWE. The
generic construction allows versatile instantiations with our OKCN and AKCN schemes, for
which we elaborate on evaluating and choosing the concrete parameters in order to achieve
an optimally-balanced performance among security, computational cost, bandwidth efficiency,
error rate, and operation simplicity.
• We propose the first construction of key exchange based on the learning with rounding
(LWR) problem, to the best of our knowledge. The rounding in LWR much reduces
the bandwidth. We provide a delicate approach to calculating the error rate accurately,
which avoids introducing some cumbersome inequalities in the traditional ways of error
rate estimation. The accuracy of error rate allows us to choose tight parameters. Our
LWR-based key exchange costs 16.39 kilo-bytes (kB) with error rate 2−35 at the level of
at least 128-bit quantum security.
• When applied to LWE-based cryptosystems, OKCN and AKCN can directly result in
more practical schemes of key exchange and CPA-secure public-key encryption. To
further save bandwidth, we make a thorough analysis of the variant where some least
significant bits of LWE samples are cut off. For instance, on recommended parame-
ters our LWE-based protocol (resp., Frodo) has 18.58kB (resp., 22.57kB) bandwidth,
887.15kB (resp., 1060.32kB) matrix, at least 134-bit (resp., 130-bit) quantum security,
and error rate 2−39 (resp., 2−38.9).
• When applied to RLWE-based cryptosystems, we make a key observation by proving that
the errors in different positions in the shared-key are essentially independent. Based upon
this observation, we present an extremely simple and fast code, referred to as single-error
correction (SEC) code, to correct at least one bit error. By equipping OKCN/AKCN
with the SEC code, we achieve the simplest RLWE-based key exchange (up to now) with
negligible error rate for much longer shared-key size; for instance, 837-bit shared-key
with bandwidth of about 0.4kB and error rate 2−69.
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1 Introduction
Most public-key cryptosystems currently in use, based on the hardness of solving (elliptic curve)
discrete logarithm or factoring large integers, will be broken, if large-scale quantum computers
are ever built. The arrival of such quantum computers is now believed by many scientists to be
merely a significant engineering challenge, and is estimated by engineers at IBM to be within
the next two decades or so. Historically, it has taken almost two decades to deploy the modern
public key cryptography infrastructure. Therefore, regardless of whether we can estimate the
exact time of the arrival of the quantum computing era, we must begin now to prepare our
information security systems to be able to resist quantum computing [NIS]. In addition, for the
content we want to protect over a period of 15 years or longer, it becomes necessary to switch
to post-quantum cryptography today. This has been recognized not only by the cryptography
research community, but also by standardization bodies and leading information companies, for
example, NSA [NSA], NIST [NIS], U.K. CESG [CESG], the Tor project [Nic], and Google [Mat].
As noted in [ADPS16,AJS16], in the majority of contexts the most critical asymmetric primi-
tive to upgrade to post-quantum security is ephemeral key exchange (KE). KE plays a central role
in modern cryptography, which bridges public-key cryptography and symmetric-key cryptography
and can, in turn, be used to build CPA-secure public-key encryption (PKE) as well as CCA-secure
PKE in the random oracle (RO) model via the FO-transformation [FO13,Pei14,TU15], and more.
U.K. CESG has also expressed their preference for post-quantum algorithms (in particular, post-
quantum KE schemes) over quantum technologies “such as Quantum Key Distribution” to counter
the threat of quantum computing [CESG].
Lattice-based cryptography is among the major mathematical approaches to achieving se-
curity resistant to quantum attacks. For cryptographic usage, compared with the classic hard
lattice problems such as SVP and CVP, the learning with errors (LWE) problem is proven to
be much more versatile [Reg09]. Nevertheless, LWE-based cryptosystems are usually less effi-
cient, which was then resolved by the introduction of the ring-LWE (RLWE) problem [LPR13a].
In recent years, large numbers of impressive works are developed from LWE and RLWE, with
(ephemeral) key exchange and public-key encryption being the study focus of this work [JD12,
Pei14, BCNS15, ADPS16, BCD+16, Reg09, GPV08, LP10, LPR13a, LPR13b, PG13]. For an excel-
lent survey of lattice-based cryptography, the reader is referred to [Pei16].
Some celebrating progresses on achieving practical LWE- and RLWE-based key exchange are
made in recent years. The performance of RLWE-based key exchange is significantly improved
with NewHope [ADPS16], which achieves 256-bit shared-key with error rate about 2−61. The
negligible error rate of NewHope is achieved by decoding the four-dimensional lattice D˜4. De-
coding the 24-dimensional Leech lattice is also recently considered in [Pop16]. But decoding the
four-dimensional lattice D˜4 has already been relatively complicated and computationally less ef-
ficient. Compared to LWE, the additional ring structure of RLWE helps to improve the efficiency
of cryptosystems, but the concrete hardness of RLWE remains less clear. The work [BCD+16]
proposes a key exchange protocol Frodo only based on LWE, and demonstrates that LWE-based
key exchange can be practical as well. Nevertheless, bandwidth of Frodo is relatively large, as
Frodo uses about 22kB bandwidth for its recommended parameter set. In addition, Frodo has
relatively large error rates, and cannot be directly used for PKE. Whether further improvements
on LWE- and RLWE-based key exchange, as well as CPA-secure PKE, can be achieved remains
an interesting question of practical significance.
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One of the main technical contributions in the works [ADPS16,BCD+16,PG13], among others,
is the improvement and generalization of the key reconciliation mechanisms [Pei14, JD12].1 But
the key reconciliation mechanisms were only previously used and analyzed, for both KE and
PKE, in a non-black-box way. This means, for new key reconciliation mechanisms developed in
the future to be used for constructing lattice-based cryptosystems, we need to make analysis from
scratch. Also, for the various parameters involved in key reconciliation, the bounds on what could
or couldn’t be achieved are unclear.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this work, we abstract some key ingredients in previous LWE- and RLWE-based key exchange
protocols, by introducing and formalizing the building tool, referred to as key consensus (KC)
and its asymmetric variant AKC. KC and AKC allow two communicating parties to reach con-
sensus from close values obtained by some secure information exchange, such as exchanging their
LWE/RLWE samples. We then discover upper bounds on parameters for any KC and AKC, and
make comparisons between KC/AKC and fuzzy extractor [DORS08]. KC and AKC are funda-
mental to lattice based cryptography, in the sense that a list of cryptographic primitives based
on LWE or RLWE (including key exchange, public-key encryption, and more) can be modularly
constructed from them. As a conceptual contribution, this much simplifies the design and analysis
of these cryptosystems in the future.
We then design and analyze both general and highly practical KC and AKC schemes, which are
referred to as OKCN and AKCN respectively for presentation simplicity. Our OKCN and AKCN
schemes are optimal in a sense of achieving optimal balance among security, (computational and
bandwidth) efficiency, and operation simplicity. Firstly, the correctness constraints on parameters
are almost the same as the upper bounds we discovered. Secondly, the generality of our schemes
allows us to take optimal balance among parameters in order to choose parameters towards
different goals. Thirdly, the operations involved are simple.
Based on KC and AKC, we present generic constructions of key exchange from LWR,LWE
and RLWE with delicate analysis of error rates. Then, for the instantiations of these generic
constructions with our OKCN and AKCN schemes, we elaborate on evaluating and choosing
the concrete parameters in order to achieve an optimally-balanced performance among security,
computational efficiency, bandwidth efficiency, error rate, and operation simplicity.
• We propose the first construction of key exchange based on the learning with rounding
(LWR) problem, to the best of our knowledge. The rounding in LWR much reduces the
bandwidth. We provide a delicate approach to calculating the error rate accurately, which
avoids introducing some cumbersome inequalities in the traditional ways of error rate esti-
mation. The accuracy of error rate allows us to choose tight parameters. Our LWR-based
key exchange costs 16.39kB with error rate 2−35 at the level of at least 128-bit quantum
security.
• When applied to LWE-based cryptosystems, OKCN and AKCN can directly result in more
practical or well-balanced schemes of key exchange and CPA-secure public-key encryption.
To further save bandwidth, we make a thorough analysis of the variant where some least
1To our knowledge, the key reconciliation mechanism in [Pei14] is the first that fits our KC definition (the
mechanism in [JD12] requires the distance be of special types). The Lindner-Peikert mechanism implicitly presented
for PKE [LP10] is the first that fits our AKC definition. The reader is referred to [ADPS16b] for a detailed survey
on key exchange from LWE and RLWE.
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significant bits of LWE samples are cut off. We remark that cutting off some least bits of
LWE samples can only improve the actual security guarantee in reality, but complicates the
analysis of error rates. For instance, on recommended parameters our LWE-based protocol
(resp., Frodo) has 18.58kB (resp., 22.57kB) bandwidth, 887.15kB (resp., 1060.32kB) matrix,
at least 134-bit (resp., 130-bit) quantum security, and error rate 2−39 (resp., 2−38.9).
• When applied to RLWE-based cryptosystems, to the best of our knowledge, AKCN can
lead to more (bandwidth) efficient schemes of CPA-secure PKE and AKC-based KE with
negligible error rate. In order to achieve 256-bit shared-key with negligible error rate,
we use the technique of NewHope by encoding and decoding the four-dimensional lattice
D˜4, which results in a protocol named AKCN-4:1 that is (slightly) better than NewHope-
simple [ADPS16b] in bandwidth expansion.
However, encoding and decoding D˜4 is relatively complicated and computationally less
efficient. In this work, we make a key observation on RLWE-based key exchange, by proving
that the errors in different positions in the shared-key are almost independent. Based
upon this observation, we present an super simple and fast code, referred to as single-error
correction (SEC) code, to correct at least one bit error. By equipping OKCN/AKCN with
the SEC code, we achieve the simplest (up to now) RLWE-based key exchange, from both
OKCN and AKCN, with negligible error rate for much longer shared-key size; for instance,
837-bit shared-key with bandwidth of about 0.4kB and error rate 2−69.
Finally, we briefly discuss the applications of OKCN and AKCN to public-key encryption,
authenticated key exchange, key transport, and TLS. As a fundamental building tool for lattice-
based cryptographic schemes, we suggest OKCN, AKCN and the various KE protocols based
on them are of independent value. They may possibly find more applications in more advanced
cryptographic primitives (e.g., oblivious transfer, IBE, ABE, FHE) from LWR, LWE and RLWE,
by simplifying their design and analysis with versatile performance optimization or balance.
All the main protocols developed in this work are implemented. The code and scripts, together
with those for evaluating concrete security and error rates, are available from Github http:
//github.com/OKCN.
1.2 Subsequent or Concurrent Works
A PKE scheme, named Lizard, is recently presented in [CKLS16]. It is easy to see that the under-
lying key consensus mechanism of Lizard is just instantiated from our AKCN scheme presented
in Algorithm 4 (see more details in Appendix F).2
Recently, we notice that an AKC-based variant of NewHope, named NewHope-simple, was pre-
sented in a note [ADPS16b]. In comparison, NewHope-simple is still slightly inferior to AKCN4:1-
RLWE in bandwidth expansion (specifically, 256 vs. 1024 bits), and our SEC-equipped protocols
are simpler, have lower error rates and much longer shared-key sizes.
2AKCN was introduced at the second Asian PQC Forum (APQC 2016) on November 28, 2016, in Seoul, Korea,
and was filed and publicly available even earlier. The original version of Lizard was also presented at APQC 2016.
But we note that, according to the video presentation available from http://www.pqcforum.org/, the underlying
key consensus mechanism of Lizard presented as APQC 2016 was based on the Lindner-Peikert mechanism [LP10],
not our AKCN mechanism as appeared in the later ePrint report [CKLS16].
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2 Preliminaries
A string or value α means a binary one, and |α| is its binary length. For any real number x, bxc
denotes the largest integer that less than or equal to x, and bxe = bx + 1/2c. For any positive
integers a and b, denote by lcm(a, b) the least common multiple of them. For any i, j ∈ Z such
that i < j, denote by [i, j] the set of integers {i, i + 1, · · · , j − 1, j}. For any positive integer t,
we let Zt denote Z/tZ. The elements of Zt are represented, by default, as [0, t− 1]. Nevertheless,
sometimes, Zt is explicitly specified to be represented as [−b(t− 1)/2c, bt/2c].
If S is a finite set then |S| is its cardinality, and x← S is the operation of picking an element
uniformly at random from S. For two sets A,B ⊆ Zq, define A + B , {a + b|a ∈ A, b ∈ B}.
For an addictive group (G,+), an element x ∈ G and a subset S ⊆ G, denote by x + S the set
containing x+ s for all s ∈ S. For a set S, denote by U(S) the uniform distribution over S. For
any discrete random variable X over R, denote Supp(X) = {x ∈ R | Pr[X = x] > 0}.
We use standard notations and conventions below for writing probabilistic algorithms, exper-
iments and interactive protocols. If D denotes a probability distribution, x← D is the operation
of picking an element according to D. If α is neither an algorithm nor a set then x ← α is a
simple assignment statement. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, then A(x1, x2, · · · ; r) is the result
of running A on inputs x1, x2, · · · and coins r. We let y ← A(x1, x2, · · · ) denote the experiment
of picking r at random and letting y be A(x1, x2, · · · ; r). By Pr[R1; · · · ;Rn : E] we denote the
probability of event E, after the ordered execution of random processes R1, · · · , Rn.
We say that a function f(λ) is negligible, if for every c > 0 there exists an λc such that f(λ) <
1/λc for all λ > λc. Two distribution ensembles {X(λ, z)}λ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ and {Y (λ, z)}λ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗
are computationally indistinguishable, if for any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm
D, and for sufficiently large λ and any z ∈ {0, 1}∗, it holds |Pr[D(λ, z,X) = 1]−Pr[D(λ, z, Y ) =
1]| is negligible in λ.
2.1 The LWE, LWR, and RLWE problems
Given positive continuous α > 0, define the real Gaussian function ρα(x) , exp(−x2/2α2)/
√
2piα2
for x ∈ R. Let DZ,α denote the one-dimensional discrete Gaussian distribution over Z, which is
determined by its probability density function DZ,α(x) , ρα(x)/ρα(Z), x ∈ Z. Finally, let DZn,α
denote the n-dimensional spherical discrete Gaussian distribution over Zn, where each coordinate
is drawn independently from DZ,α.
Given positive integers n and q that are both polynomial in the security parameter λ, an
integer vector s ∈ Znq , and a probability distribution χ on Zq, let Aq,s,χ be the distribution over
Znq × Zq obtained by choosing a ∈ Znq uniformly at random, and an error term e ← χ, and
outputting the pair (a, b = aT s + e) ∈ Znq × Zq. The error distribution χ is typically taken to
be the discrete Gaussian probability distribution DZ,α defined previously; However, as suggested
in [BCD+16] and as we shall see in Section 6.1, other alternative distributions of χ can be taken.
Briefly speaking, the (decisional) learning with errors (LWE) assumption [Reg09] says that, for
sufficiently large security parameter λ, no probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm can
distinguish, with non-negligible probability, Aq,s,χ from the uniform distribution over Znq × Zq.
This holds even if A sees polynomially many samples, and even if the secret vector s is drawn
randomly from χn [ACPS09].
The LWR problem [BPR12] is a “derandomized” variant of the LWE problem. Let D be some
distribution over Znq , and s ← D. For integers q ≥ p ≥ 2 and any x ∈ Zq, denote bxep = bpqxe.
Then, for positive integers n and q ≥ p ≥ 2, the LWR distribution An,q,p(s) over Znq × Zp is
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obtained by sampling a from Znq uniformly at random, and outputting
(
a,
⌊
aT s
⌉
p
)
∈ Znq × Zp.
The search LWR problem is to recover the hidden secret s given polynomially many samples
of An,q,p(s). Briefly speaking, the (decisional) LWR assumption says that, for sufficiently large
security parameter, no PPT algorithm A can distinguish, with non-negligible probability, the
distribution An,q,p(s) from the distribution (a ← Znq , buep) where u ← Zq. This holds even if A
sees polynomially many samples.
An efficient reduction from the LWE problem to the LWR problem, for super-polynomial
large q, is provided in [BPR12]. Let B denote the bound for any component in the secret s. It
is recently shown that, when q ≥ 2mBp (equivalently, m ≤ q/2Bp), the LWE problem can be
reduced to the (decisional) LWR assumption with m independently random samples [BGM+16].
Moreover, the reduction from LWE to LWR is actually independent of the distribution of the
secret s.
For the positive integer m that is polynomial in the security parameter λ, let n , ϕ(m) denote
the totient of m, and K , Q(ζm) be the number field obtained by adjoining an abstract element
ζm satisfying Φm(ζm) = 0, where Φm(x) ∈ Z[x] is the m-th cyclotomic polynomial of degree n.
Moreover, let R , OK be the ring of integers in K. Finally, given a positive prime q = poly(λ)
such that q ≡ 1 (mod m), define the quotient ring Rq , R/qR.
We briefly review the RLWE problem, and its hardness result [LPR13a,LPR13b,DD12]. As we
shall see, it suffices in this work to consider a special case of the original ring-LWE problem defined
in [LPR13a]. Let n ≥ 16 be a power-of-two and q = poly(λ) be a positive prime such that q ≡ 1
(mod 2n). Given s← Rq, a sample drawn from the RLWE distribution An,q,α,s over Rq ×Rq is
generated by first choosing a ← Rq, e ← DZn,α, and then outputting (a,a · s + e) ∈ Rq × Rq.
Roughly speaking, the (decisional) RLWE assumption says that, for sufficiently large security
parameter λ, no PPT algorithm A can distinguish, with non-negligible probability, An,q,α,s from
the uniform distribution over Rq × Rq. This holds even if A sees polynomially many samples,
and even if the secret s is drawn randomly from the same distribution of the error polynomial
e [DD12, ACPS09]. Moreover, as suggested in [ADPS16], alternative distributions for the error
polynomials can be taken for the sake of efficiency while without essentially reducing security.
3 Key Consensus with Noise
Before presenting the definition of key consensus (KC) scheme, we first introduce a new function
| · |t relative to arbitrary positive integer t ≥ 1:
|x|t = min{x mod t, t− x mod t}, ∀x ∈ Z,
where the result of modular operation is represented in {0, ..., (t − 1)}. For instance, | − 1|t =
min{−1 mod t, (t+1) mod t} = min{t−1, 1} = 1. In the following description, we use |σ1−σ2|q
to measure the distance between two elements σ1, σ2 ∈ Zq. In this work, such a distance is caused
by small noises, and is relatively small compared to q.
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Alice
σ1 ∈ Zq
(k1, v)← Con(σ1, params)
Bob
σ2 ∈ Zq
k2 ← Rec(σ2, v, params)
v
≈
Figure 1: Brief depiction of KC, where k1, k2 ∈ Zm, v ∈ Zg and |σ1 − σ2|q ≤ d.
Definition 3.1. A key consensus scheme KC = (params,Con,Rec), briefly depicted in Figure 1,
is specified as follows.
• params = (q,m, g, d, aux) denotes the system parameters,3 where q,m, g, d are positive in-
tegers satisfying 2 ≤ m, g ≤ q, 0 ≤ d ≤ b q2c (which dominate security, correctness and
bandwidth of the KC scheme), and aux denotes some auxiliary values that are usually de-
termined by (q,m, g, d) and could be set to be a special symbol ∅ indicating “empty”.
• (k1, v)← Con(σ1, params): On input of (σ1 ∈ Zq, params), the probabilistic polynomial-time
conciliation algorithm Con outputs (k1, v), where k1 ∈ Zm is the shared-key, and v ∈ Zg is
a hint signal that will be publicly delivered to the communicating peer to help the two parties
reach consensus.
• k2 ← Rec(σ2, v, params): On input of (σ2 ∈ Zq, v, params), the deterministic polynomial-
time reconciliation algorithm Rec outputs k2 ∈ Zm.
Correctness: A KC scheme is correct, if it holds k1 = k2 for any σ1, σ2 ∈ Zq such that |σ1 −
σ2|q ≤ d.
Security: A KC scheme is secure, if k1 and v are independent, and k1 is uniformly distributed
over Zm, whenever σ1 ← Zq (i.e., σ1 is taken uniformly at random from Zq). The probability
is taken over the sampling of σ1 and the random coins used by Con.
3.1 Efficiency Upper Bound of KC
For fixed q, g, d, we expect the two communicating parties to reach as more consensus bits as
possible, so the range of consensus key m can be regarded as an indicator of efficiency. The
following theorem reveals an upper bound on the range of consensus key of a KC with parameters
q, g (parameterize bandwidth), and d (parameterize correctness). Its proof also divulges some
intrinsic properties of any correct and secure KC scheme.
Theorem 3.1. If KC = (params,Con,Rec) is a correct and secure key consensus scheme, and
params = (q,m, g, d, aux), then
2md ≤ q
(
1− 1
g
)
.
Remark: Some comments are in order. Theorem 3.1 divulges an efficiency upper bound on the
system parameters of KC schemes, and allows us to take balance on these parameters according to
different priorities among security, computational efficiency and bandwidth consumption. When
3In practice, the system parameters are usually set by the higher-level protocol that calls KC.
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balancing these parameters, we are mainly concerned with the parameters (q, d,m), with a focus
on the parameter q that dominates the security and efficiency of the underlying KC scheme. The
parameter g is mainly related to bandwidth. But the bandwidth reduction with a smaller g can
be overtaken by the overall efficiency gains with a smaller q.
Before proceeding to prove Theorem 3.1, we first prove the following propositions.
Proposition 3.1. Given params = (q,m, g, d, aux) for a correct and secure KC scheme. For any
arbitrary fixed σ1 ∈ Zq, if Con(σ1, params) outputs (k1, v) with positive prabability, then the value
k1 is fixed w.r.t. the (v, σ1). That is, for any random coins (r, r
′), if Con(σ1, params, r) = (k1, v)
and Con(σ1, params, r
′) = (k′1, v), then k1 = k′1.
Proof. Let σ2 = σ1, then |σ1 − σ2|q = 0 ≤ d. Then, according to the correctness of KC, we have
that k1 = k2 = Rec(σ2, v) = Rec(σ1, v). However, as Rec is a deterministic algorithm, k2 is fixed
w.r.t. (σ1, v). As a consequence, k1 is also fixed w.r.t. (σ1, v), no matter what randomness is
used by Con.
Proposition 3.2. Given params = (q,m, g, d, aux) for a KC scheme, for any v ∈ Zg, let Sv be
the set containing all σ1 such that Con(σ1, params) outputs v with positive probability. Specifically,
Sv =
{
σ1 ∈ Zq | Pr
[
(k1, v
′)← Con(σ1, params) : v′ = v
]
> 0
}
.
Then, there exists v0 ∈ Zg such that |Sv0 | ≥ q/g.
Proof. For each σ1 ∈ Zq, we run Con(σ1, params) and get a pair (k1, v) ∈ Zm × Zg satisfying
σ1 ∈ Sv. Then, the proposition is clear by the pigeonhole principle.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. From Proposition 3.2, there exists a v0 ∈ Zg such that |Sv0 | ≥ q/g. Note
that, for any σ1 ∈ Sv0 , Con(σ1, params) outputs v0 with positive probability.
For each i ∈ Zm, let Ki denote the set containing all σ1 such that Con(σ1, params) outputs
(k1 = i, v = v0) with positive probability. From Proposition 3.1, Ki’s form a disjoint partition
of Sv0 . From the independence between k1 and v, and the uniform distribution of k1, (as we
assume the underlying KC is secure), we know Pr[k1 = i | v = v0] = Pr[k1 = i] > 0, and so Ki is
non-empty for each i ∈ Zm. Now, for each i ∈ Zm, denote by K ′i the set containing all σ2 ∈ Zq
such that Rec(σ2, v0, params) = i. As Rec is deterministic, K
′
i’s are well-defined and are disjoint.
From the correctness of KC, for every σ1 ∈ Ki, |σ2 − σ1|q ≤ d, we have σ2 ∈ K ′i. That is,
Ki + [−d, d] ⊆ K ′i.
We shall prove that Ki + [−d, d] contains at least |Ki| + 2d elements. If Ki + [−d, d] = Zm,
then m = 1, which is a contradiction (we exclude the case of m = 1 in the definition of KC as it is
a trivial case). If there exists an x ∈ Zm such that x /∈ Ki + [−d, d], we can see Zm as a segment
starting from the point x by arranging its elements as x, (x+ 1) mod m, (x+ 2) mod m, . . . , (x+
m− 1) mod m. Let l be the left most element in Ki + [−d, d] on the segment, and r be the right
most such element. Then Ki + [−d, d] contains at least |Ki| elements between l and r inclusively
on the segment. Since l + [−d, 0] and r + [0, d] are subset of Ki + [−d, d], and are not overlap
(because x /∈ Ki + [−d, d]), the set Ki + [−d, d] contains at least |Ki|+ 2d elements.
Now we have |Ki|+ 2d ≤ |K ′i|. When we add up on both sides for all i ∈ Zm, then we derive
|Sv0 |+ 2md ≤ q. By noticing that |Sv0 | ≥ q/g, the theorem is established.
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3.2 Construction and Analysis of OKCN
The key consensus scheme, named “optimally-balanced key consensus with noise (OKCN)”, is
presented in Algorithm 1, followed with some explanations for implementation details.
Define σ′A = ασ1+e. Note that it always holds σ
′
A < q
′. However, in some rare cases, σ′A could
be a negative value; for example, for the case that σ1 = 0 and e ∈ [−b(α− 1)/2c,−1]. Setting
σA = σ
′
A mod q
′, in line 4, is to ensure that σA is always a non-negative value in Zq′ , which
can be simply implemented as follows: if σ′A < 0 then set σA = σ
′
A + q
′, otherwise set σA = σ′A.
Considering potential timing attacks, conditional statement judging whether σ′A is negative or
not can be avoided by a bitwise operation extracting the sign bit of σ′A. In specific, suppose σ
′
A
is a 16-bit signed or unsigned integer, then one can code σA = σ
′
A + ((σ
′
A >> 15)&1) ∗ q′ in C
language. The same techniques can also be applied to the calculation in line 11.
In lines 5 and 6, (k1, v
′) can actually be calculated simultaneously by a single command div in
assembly language. In line 11, the floating point arithmetic can be replaced by integer arithmetic.
If m is small enough, such as 2 or 3, the slow complex integer division operation can be replaced
by relative faster conditional statements.
Algorithm 1 OKCN: Optimally-balanced KC with Noise
1: params = (q,m, g, d, aux), aux = {q′ = lcm(q,m), α = q′/q, β = q′/m}
2: procedure Con((σ1, params)) . σ1 ∈ [0, q − 1]
3: e← [−b(α− 1)/2c, bα/2c]
4: σA = (ασ1 + e) mod q
′
5: k1 = bσA/βc ∈ Zm
6: v′ = σA mod β
7: v = bv′g/βc . v ∈ Zg
8: return (k1, v)
9: end procedure
10: procedure Rec(σ2, v, params) . σ2 ∈ [0, q − 1]
11: k2 = bασ2/β − (v + 1/2)/ge mod m
12: return k2
13: end procedure
The value v + 1/2, in line 11, estimates the exact value of v′g/β. Such an estimation can
be more accurate, if one chooses to use the average value of all v′g/β’s such that bv′g/βc = v.
Though such accuracy can improve the bound on correctness slightly, the formula calculating k2
becomes more complicated.
3.2.1 Correctness and Security of OKCN
Recall that, for arbitrary positive integer t ≥ 1 and any x ∈ Z, |x|t = min{x mod t, t− x mod t}.
Then, the following fact is direct from the definition of | · |t.
Fact 3.1. For any x, y, t, l ∈ Z where t ≥ 1 and l ≥ 0, if |x− y|q ≤ l, then there exists θ ∈ Z and
δ ∈ [−l, l] such that x = y + θt+ δ.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose that the system parameters satisfy (2d+ 1)m < q
(
1− 1g
)
where m ≥ 2
and g ≥ 2. Then, the OKCN scheme is correct.
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Proof. Suppose |σ1 − σ2|q ≤ d. By Fact 3.1, there exist θ ∈ Z and δ ∈ [−d, d] such that
σ2 = σ1 + θq + δ. From line 4 and 6 in Algorithm 1, we know that there is a θ
′ ∈ Z, such that
ασ1 + e + θ
′q′ = σA = k1β + v′. And from the definition of α, β, we have α/β = m/q. Taking
these into the formula of k2 in Rec (line 11 in Algorithm 1), we have
k2 = bασ2/β − (v + 1/2)/ge mod m (1)
= bα(θq + σ1 + δ)/β − (v + 1/2)/ge mod m (2)
=
⌊
m(θ − θ′) + 1
β
(k1β + v
′ − e) + αδ
β
− 1
g
(v + 1/2)
⌉
mod m (3)
=
⌊
k1 +
(
v′
β
− v + 1/2
g
)
− e
β
+
αδ
β
⌉
mod m (4)
Notice that |v′/β − (v + 1/2)/g| = |v′g − β(v + 1/2)|/βg ≤ 1/2g. So∣∣∣∣(v′β − v + 1/2g
)
− e
β
+
αδ
β
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12g + αβ (d+ 1/2).
From the assumed condition (2d + 1)m < q(1 − 1g ), we get that the right-hand side is strictly
smaller than 1/2; Consequently, after the rounding, k2 = k1.
Theorem 3.3. OKCN is secure. Specifically, when σ1 ← Zq, k1 and v are independent, and k1
is uniform over Zm, where the probability is taken over the sampling of σ1 and the random coins
used by Con.
Proof. Recall that q′ = lcm(q,m), α = q′/q, β = q′/m. We first demonstrate that σA is subject
to uniform distribution over Zq′ . Consider the map f : Zq×Zα → Zq′ ; f(σ, e) = (ασ+ e) mod q′,
where the elements in Zq and Zα are represented in the same way as specified in Algorithm 1. It
is easy to check that f is an one-to-one map. Since σ1 ← Zq and e← Zα are subject to uniform
distributions, and they are independent, σA = (ασ1 + e) mod q
′ = f(σ1, e) is also subject to
uniform distribution over Zq′ .
In the similar way, defining f ′ : Zm × Zβ → Zq′ such that f ′(k1, v′) = βk1 + v′, then f ′ is
obviously a one-to-one map. From line 6 of Algorithm 1, f ′(k1, v′) = σA. As σA is distributed
uniformly over Zq′ , (k1, v′) is uniformly distributed over Zm×Zβ, and so k1 and v′ are independent.
As v only depends on v′, k1 and v are independent.
3.2.2 Special Parameters, and Performance Speeding-Up
The first and the second line of Con (line 3 and 4 in Algorithm 1) play the role in transforming a
uniform distribution over Zq to a uniform distribution over Zq′ . If one chooses q, g,m to be power
of 2, i.e., q = 2q¯, g = 2g¯,m = 2m¯ where q¯, g¯, m¯ ∈ Z, then such transformation is not necessary. In
this case Con and Rec can be simplified as follows:
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Algorithm 2 OKCN power 2
1: params : q = 2q¯, g = 2g¯,m = 2m¯, d, aux = {(β = q/m = 2q¯−m¯, γ = β/g = 2q¯−m¯−g¯)}
2: procedure Con(σ1, params)
3: k1 = bσ1/βc
4: v = b(σ1 mod β)/γc
5: return (k1, v)
6: end procedure
7: procedure Rec(σ2, v, params)
8: k2 = bσ2/β − (v + 1/2)/ge mod m
9: return k2
10: end procedure
Since the random noise e used in calculating σA in Algorithm 1 is avoided, the correctness
constraint on parameters can be relaxed, and we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1. If q and m are power of 2, and d, g,m satisfy 2md < q
(
1− 1g
)
, then the KC
scheme described in Algorithm 2 is both correct and secure.
Proof. For correctness, as no additional noise e is added, one can take e = 0 into Formula 4, and
then the correctness of Algorithm 2 directly follows from the proof of Theorem 3.2. For security,
as a variation of the generic structure of Algorithm 1, the security of Algorithm 2 inherits from
that of Algorithm 1.
If we take g¯ + m¯ = q¯, Algorithm 2 can be further simplified into the variant depicted in
Algorithm 3, with the constraint on parameters is further relaxed.
Corollary 3.2. If m, g are power of 2, q = m · g, and 2md < q, then the KC scheme described in
Algorithm 3 is correct and secure. Notice that the constraint on parameters is further simplified
to 2md < q in this case.
Proof. For correctness, supposing |σ1 − σ2|q ≤ d, by Fact 3.1, there exist θ ∈ Z and δ ∈ [−d, d]
such that σ2 = σ1 + θq + δ. Taking this into line 8 of Algorithm 3, i.e., the formula computing
k2, we have
k2 = b(σ1 − v + θq + δ)/ge mod m
= (k1 + θm+ bδ/ge) mod m.
If 2md < q, then |δ/g| ≤ d/g < 1/2, so that k2 = k1 mod m = k1.
For security, as a special case of generic scheme described in Algorithm 1, the security of
Algorithm 3 follows directly from that of Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 3 OKCN simple
1: params : q = 2q¯, g = 2g¯,m = 2m¯, d, where g¯ + m¯ = q¯
2: procedure Con(σ1, params)
3: k1 =
⌊
σ1
g
⌋
4: v = σ1 mod g
5: return (k1, v)
6: end procedure
7: procedure Rec(σ2, v, params)
8: k2 =
⌊
σ2−v
g
⌉
mod m
9: return k2
10: end procedure
4 Asymmetric Key Consensus with Noise
Alice
σ1
k1 ∈ Zm
v ← Con(σ1, k1, params)
Bob
σ2
k2 ← Rec(σ2, v, params)
v
≈
Figure 2: Brief depiction of AKC
When OKCN is used as the building tool in constructing key exchange (KE) protocols, the party
who sends the hint signal v actually plays the role of the responder. When cast into secure
transport protocols in the client/server setting, e.g., the next generation of TLS 1.3 [Res], the
client (corresponding to Bob) plays the role of the initiator, and the server (corresponding to
Alice) plays the role of the responder. For OKCN-based key exchange, both the initiator and the
responder play a symmetric role in outputting the shared-key, in the sense that no one can pre-
determine the session-key before the KE protocol run. Specifically, the responder can calculate
the session-key only after receiving the ephemeral message from the initiator (unless the message
from the initiator is public or static). However, in some application scenarios particularly in the
client/server setting like those based upon TLS1.3, it is desirable to render the server asymmetric
power in predetermining session-keys before the protocol run, e.g., in order to balance workloads
and security or to resist the more and more vicious DDoS attacks. For example, this can much
reduce the online burden faced by the server, by offline or parallel computing the following
ciphertexts or MACs with the pre-determined session-keys.
Another motivation is that OKCN-based key exchange, with negligible failure probability,
cannot be directly transformed into a CPA-secure public-key encryption (PKE) scheme without
additionally employing a CPA-secure symmetric-key encryption (SKE) scheme. These motivate
us to introduce asymmetric key consensus with noise (AKCN), as depicted in Figure 2 and
specified below.
Definition 4.1. An asymmetric key consensus scheme AKC = (params,Con,Rec) is specified as
follows:
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• params = (q,m, g, d, aux) denotes the system parameters, where q, 2 ≤ m, g ≤ q, 1 ≤ d ≤
b q2c are positive integers, and aux denotes some auxiliary values that are usually determined
by (q,m, g, d) and could be set to be empty.
• v ← Con(σ1, k1, params): On input of (σ1 ∈ Zq, k1 ∈ Zm, params), the probabilistic polynomial-
time conciliation algorithm Con outputs the public hint signal v ∈ Zg.
• k2 ← Rec(σ2, v, params): On input of (σ2, v, params), the deterministic polynomial-time
algorithm Rec outputs k2 ∈ Zm.
Correctness: An AKC scheme is correct, if it holds k1 = k2 for any σ1, σ2 ∈ Zq such that
|σ1 − σ2|q ≤ d.
Security: An AKC scheme is secure, if v is independent of k1 whenever σ1 is uniformly dis-
tributed over Zq. Specifically, for arbitrary v˜ ∈ Zg and arbitrary k˜1, k˜′1 ∈ Zm, it holds that
Pr[v = v˜|k1 = k˜1] = Pr[v = v˜|k1 = k˜′1], where the probability is taken over σ1 ← Zq and the
random coins used by Con.
When AKC is used as a building tool for key exchange, k1 is taken uniformly at random from
Zq. However, when AKC is used for public-key encryption, k1 can be arbitrary value from the
space of plaintext messages.
For the efficiency upper bound of AKC, the following theorem divulges bounds on bandwidth
(parameterized by g), consensus range (parameterized by m), and correctness (parameterized by
d) for any AKC scheme.
Theorem 4.1. Let AKC = (params,Con,Rec) be an asymmetric key consensus scheme with
params = (q,m, d, g, aux). If AKC is correct and secure, then
2md ≤ q
(
1− m
g
)
.
Comparing the formula 2md ≤ q(1−m/g) in Theorem 4.1 with the formula 2md ≤ q(1−1/g)
in Theorem 3.1, we see that the only difference is a factor m in g. This indicates that, on the
same values of (q,m, d), an AKC scheme has to use a bigger bandwidth parameter g compared to
KC. Before proving Theorem 4.1, we first adjust Proposition 3.2 to the AKC setting, as following.
Proposition 4.1. Given params = (q,m, g, d, aux) for an correct and secure AKC scheme, then
there exists v0 ∈ Zg such that |Sv0 | ≥ mq/g.
Proof. If k1 is taken uniformly at random from Zm, AKC can be considered as a special KC scheme
by treating k1 ← Zm; v ← Con(σ1, k1, params) as (k1, v)← Con(σ1, params). Consequently, Propo-
sition 3.1 holds for this case. Denote S′v
4
= {(σ1, k1) ∈ Zq × Zm | Pr [v′ ← Con(σ1, k1, params) : v′ = v] > 0}.
Then, Sv defined in Proposition 3.2 equals to the set containing all the values of σ1 appeared
in (σ1, ·) ∈ S′v. We run Con(σ1, k1, params) for each pair of (σ1, k1) ∈ Zq × Zm. By the pi-
geonhole principle, there must exist a v0 ∈ Zg such that |S′v0 | ≥ qm/g. For any two pairs
(σ1, k1) and (σ
′
1, k
′
1) in S
′
v0 , if σ1 = σ
′
1, from Proposition 3.1 we derive that k1 = k
′
1, and
then (σ1, k1) = (σ
′
1, k
′
1). Hence, if (σ1, k1) and (σ
′
1, k
′
1) are different, then σ1 6= σ′1, and so
|Sv0 | = |S′v0 | ≥ mq/g.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. By viewing AKC, with k1 ← Zq, as a special KC scheme, all the reasoning
in the proof of Theorem 3.1 holds true now. At the end of the proof of Theorem 3.1, we derive
|Sv0 |+ 2md ≤ q. By taking |Sv0 | ≥ mq/g according to Proposition 4.1, the proof is finished.
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4.1 Construction and Analysis of AKCN
Algorithm 4 AKCN: Asymmetric KC with Noise
1: params = (q,m, g, d, aux), where aux = ∅.
2: procedure Con(σ1, k1, params) . σ1 ∈ [0, q − 1]
3: v = bg (σ1 + bk1q/me) /qe mod g
4: return v
5: end procedure
6: procedure Rec(σ2, v, params) . σ2 ∈ [0, q − 1]
7: k2 = bm(v/g − σ2/q)e mod m
8: return k2
9: end procedure
The AKC scheme, referred to as asymmetric KC with noise (AKCN), is depicted in Algorithm 4.
We note that, in some sense, AKCN could be viewed as the generalization and optimization of the
consensus mechanism proposed in [LPR13a] for CPA-secure public-key encryption. For AKCN,
we can offline compute and store k1 and gbk1q/me in order to accelerate online performance.
4.1.1 Correctness and Security of AKCN
Theorem 4.2. Suppose the parameters of AKCN satisfy (2d + 1)m < q
(
1− mg
)
. Then, the
AKCN scheme described in Algorithm 4 is correct.
Proof. From the formula generating v, we know that there exist 1, 2 ∈ R and θ ∈ Z, where
|1| ≤ 1/2 and |2| ≤ 1/2, such that
v =
g
q
(
σ1 +
(
k1q
m
+ 1
))
+ 2 + θg
Taking this into the formula computing k2 in Rec, we have
k2 = bm(v/g − σ2/q)e mod m
=
⌊
m
(
1
q
(σ1 + k1q/m+ 1) +
2
g
+ θ − σ2
q
)⌉
mod m
=
⌊
k1 +
m
q
(σ1 − σ2) + m
q
1 +
m
g
2
⌉
mod m
By Fact 3.1 (page 11), there exist θ′ ∈ Z and δ ∈ [−d, d] such that σ1 = σ2 + θ′q + δ. Hence,
k2 =
⌊
k1 +
m
q
δ +
m
q
1 +
m
g
2
⌉
mod m
Since |mδ/q +m1/q +m2/g| ≤ md/q +m/2q +m/2g < 1/2, k1 = k2.
Theorem 4.3. The AKCN scheme is secure. Specifically, v is independent of k1 when σ1 ← Zq.
Proof. For arbitrary v˜ ∈ Zg and arbitrary k˜1, k˜′1 ∈ Zm, we prove that Pr[v = v˜|k1 = k˜1] = Pr[v =
v˜|k1 = k˜′1] when σ1 ← Zq.
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For any (k˜, v˜) in Zm × Zg, the event (v = v˜ | k1 = k˜) is equivalent to the event that
there exists σ1 ∈ Zq such that v˜ = bg(σ1 + bk˜q/me)/qe mod g. Note that σ1 ∈ Zq satisfies
v˜ = bg(σ1 + bk˜q/me)/qe mod g, if and only if there exist  ∈ (−1/2, 1/2] and θ ∈ Z such that
v˜ = g(σ1+bk˜q/me)/q+−θg. That is, σ1 = (q(v˜−)/g−bk˜q/me) mod q, for some  ∈ (−1/2, 1/2].
Let Σ(v˜, k˜) = {σ1 ∈ Zq | ∃ ∈ (−1/2, 1/2] s.t. σ1 = (q(v˜ − )/g − bk˜q/me) mod q}. Defining the
map φ : Σ(v˜, 0) → Σ(v˜, k˜), by setting φ(x) =
(
x− bk˜q/me
)
mod q. Then φ is obviously a one-
to-one map. Hence, the cardinality of Σ(v˜, k˜) is irrelevant to k˜. Specifically, for arbitrary v˜ ∈ Zg
and arbitrary k˜1, k˜
′
1 ∈ Zm, it holds that
∣∣∣Σ(v˜, k˜1)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Σ(v˜, k˜′1)∣∣∣ = |Σ(v˜, 0)|
Now, for arbitrary v˜ ∈ Zg and arbitrary k˜ ∈ Zm, when σ1 ← Zq we have that Pr[v = v˜ | k1 =
k˜] = Pr
[
σ1 ∈ Σ(v˜, k˜) | k1 = k˜
]
= |Σ(v˜, k˜)|/q = |Σ(v˜, 0)|/q. The right-hand side only depends on
v˜, and so v is independent of k1.
4.1.2 A Simplified Variant of AKCN for Special Parameters
We consider the parameters q = g = 2q¯,m = 2m¯ for positive integers q¯, m¯. Then the two rounding
operations in line 3 of Con (in Algorithm 4) can be directly eliminated, since only integers are
involved in the computation. We have the following variant described in Algorithm 5. Note
that, in Algorithm 5, the modular and multiplication/division operations can be implemented by
simple bitwise operations.
Algorithm 5 AKCN power 2
1: params : q = g = 2q¯,m = 2m¯, aux = {G = q/m}
2: procedure Con(σ1, k1, params)
3: v = (σ1 + k1 ·G) mod q, where k1 ·G can be offline computed
4: return v
5: end procedure
6: procedure Rec(σ2, v, params)
7: k2 = b(v − σ2)/Ge mod m
8: return k2
9: end procedure
For the protocol variant presented in Algorithm 5, its correctness and security can be proved
with a relaxed constraint on the parameters of (q, d,m), as shown in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1. If q and m are power of 2, and d, m and q satisfy 2md < q, then the AKCN
scheme described in Algorithm 5 is correct and secure.
Proof. For correctness, suppose |σ1 − σ2|q ≤ d, then there exit δ ∈ [−d, d] and θ ∈ Z such that
σ2 = σ1+θq+δ. From the formula calculating v, there exists θ
′ ∈ Z such that v = σ1+k12q¯−m¯+θ′q.
Taking these into the formula computing k2, line 7 of Rec in Algorithm 5, we have
k2 = b(v − σ1 − δ − θq) /2q¯−m¯e mod m
= b(k12q¯−m¯ − δ)/2q¯−m¯e mod m
=
(
k1 − bδ/2q¯−m¯e
)
mod m
If 2md < q, then |δ/2q¯−m¯| < 1/2, so that k1 = k2.
For security, as a special case of the generic AKCN scheme in Algorithm 4, the security of the
AKCN scheme in Algorithm 5 directly follows from that of Algorithm 4.
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4.2 On KC/AKC vs. Fuzzy Extractor
Our formulations of KC and AKC are abstractions of the core ingredients of previous constructions
of KE and PKE from LWE/RLWE. As we shall see in the subsequent sections, the design and
analysis of KE and PKE from LWE, LWR and RLWE can be reduced to KC and AKC. We also
note that KC and AKC are similar to fuzzy extractor proposed in [DORS08], which extracts
shared-keys from biometrics and noisy data. In this section, we make some discussions on the
relationship between KC/AKC and fuzzy extractor.
The differences between the definitions of KC/AKC and that of fuzzy extractor lie mainly in
the following ways. Firstly, AKC was not considered within the definitional framework of fuzzy
extractor. Secondly, the metric | · |q we use in defining KC and AKC was not considered for fuzzy
extractor. Thirdly, in the definitions of KC and AKC, the algorithm Rec (corresponding Rep for
fuzzy extractor) is mandated to be deterministic, while in the formulation of fuzzy extractor it
is probabilistic. Fourthly, in the formulation of fuzzy extractor [DORS08], w, R and P (corre-
sponding σ1, k and v in KC/AKC) are binary strings; while in the definitions of KC/AKC, the
corresponding values σ1 ∈ Zq, k ∈ Zm and v ∈ Zg have more structured ranges, which are helpful
in deriving the exact upper bound. Finally, for the security of KC and AKC, we require that the
signal value v be independent of the shared-key k1 (that can be subject to arbitrary distribution
for AKC); roughly speaking, in the definition of fuzzy extractor [DORS08], it is required that the
joint distribution (R,P ) be statistically close to (Ul, P ) where R ∈ {0, 1}l and Ul is the uniform
distribution over {0, 1}l.
A generic upper bound on the length of key extracted by fuzzy extractor is proposed in
[DORS08, Appendix C]. In comparison, the upper bounds for KC and AKC proved in this work
are more versatile and precise w.r.t. the metric | · |q. For example, the effect of the length of
the signal v, i.e., the bandwidth parameter g, is not considered in the upper bound for fuzzy
extractor, but is taken into account in the upper bounds for KC and AKC.
A generic construction of fuzzy extractor from secure sketch, together with a generic con-
struction of secure sketch for transitive metric spaces, is proposed in [DORS08]. We note that
(Zq, | · |q) can be naturally seen as a transitive matric space. Compared to the secure sketch based
generic constructions of fuzzy extractor, our constructions of KC and AKC are direct and more
efficient.
In spite of some similarities between KC/AKC and fuzzy extractors, we remark that before
our this work the relation between fuzzy extractor and KE from LWR and its variants is actu-
ally opaque. Explicitly identifying and formalizing KC/AKC and reducing lattice-based KE to
KC/AKC in a black-box modular way, with inherent bounds on what could or couldn’t be done,
cut the complexity of future design and analysis of these cryptosystems.
5 LWR-Based Key Exchange from KC and AKC
In this section, we present the applications of OKCN and AKCN to key exchange protocols based
on LWR. The LWR-based key exchange (KE) is depicted in Figure 3. Denote by (n, lA, lB, q, p,KC, χ)
the system parameters, where p|q, and p and q are chosen to be power of 2. Let KC = (params =
(p,m, g, d, aux),Con,Rec) be a correct and secure key consensus scheme, χ be a small noise dis-
tribution over Zq, and Gen be a pseudo-random generator (PRG) generating the matrix A from
a small seed. For presentation simplicity, we assume A ∈ Zn×nq to be square matrix. The length
of the random seed, i.e., κ, is typically set to be 256.
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Initiator
seed← {0, 1}κ
A = Gen(seed) ∈ Zn×nq
X1 ← χn×lA
Y1 = ⌊AX1⌉p
Responder
A = Gen(seed)
X2 ← χn×lB
Y2 = ⌊ATX2⌉p
ϵ ← [−q/2p, q/2p− 1]n×lA
Σ2 = Y
T
1X2 + ⌊ϵTX2⌉p
(K2,V) ← Con(Σ2, params)
Σ1 = X
T
1Y2
K1 ← Rec(Σ1,V, params)
seed,Y1 ∈ Zn×lAp
Y2 ∈ Zn×lBp ,V ∈ ZlA×lBg
Figure 3: LWR-based key exchange from KC and AKC, where K1,K2 ∈ ZlA×lBm and |K1| =
|K2| = lAlB|m|.
The actual session-key is derived from K1 and K2 via some key derivation function KDF .
For presentation simplicity, the functions Con and Rec are applied to matrices, meaning that they
are applied to each of the coordinates respectively. We shall see that the corresponding elements
of Σ1 and Σ2 are close to each other. Then Con and Rec are applied to them to reach consensus
bits K1 and K2.
For presentation simplicity, we describe the LWR-based key exchange protocol from a KC
scheme. But it can be trivially adapted to work on any correct and secure AKC scheme. In this
case, the responder user Bob simply chooses K2 ← ZlA×lBm , and the output of Con(Σ2,K2, params)
is simply defined to be V. For presentation simplicity, in the following security definition and
analysis we also simply assume that the output of the PRG Gen is truly random (which is simply
assumed to be a random oracle in [ADPS16]).
5.1 Correctness Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the correctness (specifically, the error probability) of the LWR-
based KE protocol. For any integer x, let {x}p denote x− qpbxep, where bxep = bpqxe. Then, for
any integer x, {x}p ∈ [−q/2p, q/2p − 1], hence {x}p can be naturally regarded as an element in
Zq/p. In fact, {x}p is equal to x mod q/p, where the result is represented in [−q/2p, q/2p − 1].
When the notation {·}p is applied to a matrix, it means {·}p applies to every element of the
matrix respectively.
We have Σ2 = Y
T
1 X2+bTX2ep = bAX1eTp X2+bTX2ep = pq (AX1−{AX1}p)TX2+bTX2ep.
And Σ1 = X
T
1 Y2 = X
T
1 bATX2ep = pq (XT1 ATX2 −XT1 {ATX2}p). Hence,
Σ2 −Σ1 = p
q
(XT1 {ATX2}p − {AX1}Tp X2) + bTX2ep mod p
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=⌊
p
q
(XT1 {ATX2}p − {AX1}Tp X2 + TX2)
⌉
mod p
The general idea is that X1,X2, , {ATX2}p and {AX1}p are small enough, so that Σ1 and
Σ2 are close. If |Σ1 −Σ2|p ≤ d, the correctness of the underlying KC guarantees K1 = K2. For
given concrete parameters, we numerically derive the probability of |Σ2−Σ1|p > d by numerically
calculating the distribution of XT1 {ATX2}p − ({AX1}Tp X2 − TX2) for the case of lA = lB = 1,
then applying the union bound. The independency between variables indicated by the following
Theorem 5.1 can greatly simplify the calculation.
Let Inv(X1,X2) denote the event that there exist invertible elements of ring Zq/p in both
vectors X1 and X2. Inv(X1,X2) happens with overwhelming probability in our application.
Lemma 5.1. Consider the case of lA = lB = 1. For any a ∈ Zq/p,x ∈ Znq/p, denote Sx,a =
{y ∈ Znq/p | xTy mod (q/p) = a}. For any fixed a ∈ Zq/p, conditioned on Inv(X1,X2) and
XT1 A
TX2 mod (q/p) = a, the random vectors {ATX2}p and {AX1}p are independent, and are
subjected to uniform distribution over SX1,a, SX2,a respectively.
Proof. Under the condition of Inv(X1,X2), for any fixed X1 and X2, define the map φX1,X2 :
Zn×nq → Znq/p × Znq/p, such that A 7→ ({AX1}p, {ATX2}p).
We shall prove that the image of φX1,X2 is S = {(y1,y2) ∈ Znq/p × Znq/p | XT2 y1 = XT1 y2
mod (q/p)}. Denote X1 = (x1,X′T1 )T and y2 = (y2,y′T2 )T . Without loss of generality, we
assume x1 is invertible in the ring Zq/p. For any (y1,y2) ∈ S, we need to find an A such that
φX1,X2(A) = (y1,y2).
From the condition Inv(X1,X2), we know that there exists an A
′ ∈ Z(n−1)×n such that
{A′X2}p = y′2. Then, we let a1 = x−11 (y1 − A′TX′1) mod (q/p), and A = (a1,A′T ). Now we
check that φX1,X2(A) = (y1,y2).
{AX1}p =
{(
a1 A
′T )(x1
x′1
)}
p
= {x1a1 + A′TX′1}p = y1
{ATX2}p =
{(
aT1
A′
)
X2
}
p
=
{(
aT1 X2
A′X2
)}
p
=
{(
x−11 (y
T
1 −X′T1 A)X2
A′X2
)}
p
=
{(
x−11 (X
T
1 y2 −X′T1 y′2)
y′2
)}
p
=
{(
y2
y′2
)}
p
= y2
Hence, if we treat Zn×nq and S as Z-modules, then φX1,X2 : Zn×nq → S is a surjective homo-
morphism. Then, for any fixed (X1,X2), ({AX1}p, {ATX2}p) is uniformly distributed over S.
This completes the proof.
Theorem 5.1. Under the condition Inv(X1,X2), the following two distributions are identical:
• (a,X1,X2, {AX1}p, {ATX2}p), where A← Zn×nq , X1 ← χn, X2 ← χn, and a = XT1 ATX2 mod
(q/p).
• (a,X1,X2,y1,y2), where a← Zq/p,X1 ← χn, X2 ← χn, y1 ← SX2,a, and y2 ← SX1,a.
Proof. For any a˜ ∈ Zq/p, X˜1, X˜2 ∈ Supp(χn), y˜1, y˜2 ∈ Znq/p, we have
Pr[a = a˜,X1 = X˜1,X2 = X˜2, {AX1}p = y˜1, {ATX2}p = y˜2 | Inv(X1,X2)]
= Pr[{AX1}p = y˜1, {ATX2}p = y˜2 | a = a˜,X1 = X˜1,X2 = X˜2, Inv(X1,X2)]
Pr[a = a˜,X1 = X˜1,X2 = X˜2 | Inv(X1,X2)]
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From Lemma 5.1, the first term equals to Pr[y1 ← SX˜2,a˜; y2 ← SX˜1,a˜ : y1 = y˜1,y2 = y˜2 | a =
a˜,X1 = X˜1,X2 = X˜2, Inv(X1,X2)].
For the second term, we shall prove that a is independent of (X1,X2), and is uniformly
distributed over Zq/p. Under the condition of Inv(X1,X2), the map Zn×nq → Zq/p, such that
A 7→ XT1 ATX2 mod (q/p), is a surjective homomorphism between the two Z-modules. Then,
Pr[a = a˜ | X1 = X˜1,X2 = X˜2, Inv(X1,X2)] = p/q. Hence, under the condition of Inv(X1,X2), a
is independent of (X1,X2), and is distributed uniformly at random. So the two ways of sampling
result in the same distribution.
We design and implement the following algorithm to numerically calculate the distribution
of Σ2 −Σ1 efficiently. For any c1, c2 ∈ Zq, a ∈ Zq/p, we numerically calculate Pr[XT1 {ATX2}p =
c1] and Pr[{AX1}Tp X2 − TX2 = c2,XT1 ATX2 mod (q/p) = a], then derive the distribution of
Σ2 −Σ1.
As Inv(X1,X2) occurs with overwhelming probability, for any event E, we have |Pr[E] −
Pr[E|Inv(X1,X2)]| < negl. For simplicity, we ignore the effect of Inv(X1,X2) in the following
calculations. By Theorem 5.1, Pr[XT1 {ATX2}p = c1] = Pr[X1 ← χn,y2 ← Znq/p; XT1 y2 =
c1]. This probability can be numerically calculated by computer programs. The probability
Pr[{AX1}Tp X2− TX2 = c2,XT1 ATX2 mod (q/p) = a] can also be calculated by the similar way.
Then, for arbitrary c ∈ Zq,
Pr[Σ1 −Σ2 = c] = Pr[XT1 {ATX2}p − {AX1}Tp X2 + TX2 = c]
=
∑
c1−c2=c
a∈Zq/p
Pr[XT1 {ATX2}p=c1,{AX1}TpX2−TX2=c2|XT1ATX2 mod (q/p)=a]·
Pr[XT1A
TX2 mod (q/p)=a]
=
∑
c1−c2=c
a∈Zq/p
Pr[XT1 {ATX2}p=c1|XT1ATX2 mod (q/p)=a]·
Pr[{AX1}TpX2−TX2=c2|XT1ATX2 mod (q/p)=a] Pr[XT1ATX2 mod (q/p)=a]
=
∑
a∈Zq/p
c1−c2=c
Pr[XT1 {ATX2}p = c1, c1 mod (q/p) = a] Pr[{AX1}Tp X2 − TX2 = c2,XT1 ATX2 mod (q/p) = a]
Pr[XT1 A
TX2 mod (q/p) = a]
=
∑
a∈Zq/p
c1−c2=c
c1 mod (q/p)=a
Pr[XT1 {ATX2}p = c1] Pr[{AX1}Tp X2 − TX2 = c2,XT1 ATX2 mod (q/p) = a]
Pr[XT1 A
TX2 mod (q/p) = a]
By Theorem 5.1, conditioned on Inv(X1,X2) and X
T
1 A
TX2 mod (q/p) = a, X
T
1 {ATX2}p is
independent of {AX1}Tp X2 − TX2, which implies the second equality. Our code and scripts are
available from Github http://github.com/OKCN.
5.2 Security Proof
Definition 5.1. A KC or AKC based key exchange protocol from LWR is secure, if for any
sufficiently large security parameter λ and any PPT adversary A, ∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣ is negligible,
as defined w.r.t. game G0 specified in Algorithm 22.
4
4For presentation simplicity, we simply assume K02 ← ZlA×lBm when the key exchange protocol is implemented
with AKC. However, when the AKC-based protocol is interpreted as a public-key encryption scheme, K02 and K
1
2
correspond to the plaintexts, which are taken independently at random from the same (arbitrary) distribution over
ZlA×lBm .
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Algorithm 6 Game G0
1: A← Zn×nq
2: X1 ← χn×lA
3: Y1 = bAX1ep
4: X2 ← χn×lB
5: ← {−q/2p . . . q/2p− 1}n×lA
6: Y2 = bATX2ep
7: Σ2 = b( qpY1 + )TX2ep . Σ2 = YT1 X2 + bTX2ep = b( qpY1 + )TX2ep
8:
(
K02,V
)← Con(Σ2, params)
9: K12 ← ZlA×lBm
10: b← {0, 1}
11: b′ ← A(A,Y1,Y2,Kb2,V)
Before starting to prove the security, we first recall some basic properties of the LWR as-
sumption. The following lemma is derived by a hybrid argument, similar to that of LWE
[PVW08,BCD+16].
Lemma 5.2 (LWR problem in the matrix form). For positive integer parameters (λ, n, q ≥ 2, l, t),
where n, q, l, t all are polynomial in λ satisfying p|q, and a distribution χ over Zq, denote by
L
(l,t)
χ the distribution over Zt×nq × Zt×lp generated by taking A ← Zt×nq ,S ← χn×l and outputting
(A, bASep). Then, under the assumption on indistinguishability between Aq,s,χ (with s ← χn)
and U(Znq × Zp) within t samples, no PPT distinguisher D can distinguish, with non-negligible
probability, between the distribution L
(l,t)
χ and U(Zt×nq × Zt×lp ) for sufficiently large λ.
Theorem 5.2. If (params,Con,Rec) is a correct and secure KC or AKC scheme, the key exchange
protocol described in Figure 3 is secure under the (matrix form of) LWR assumption.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that in [Pei14,BCD+16]. The general idea is that we construct
a sequence of games: G0, G1 and G2, where G0 is the original game for defining security. In every
move from game Gi to Gi+1, 0 ≤ i ≤ 1, we change a little. All games Gi’s share the same PPT
adversary A, whose goal is to distinguish between the matrices chosen uniformly at random and
the matrices generated in the actual key exchange protocol. Denote by Ti, 0 ≤ i ≤ 2, the event
that b = b′ in Game Gi. Our goal is to prove that Pr[T0] < 1/2 + negl, where negl is a negligible
function in λ. For ease of readability, we re-produce game G0 below. For presentation simplicity,
in the subsequent analysis, we always assume the underlying KC or AKC is correct. The proof
can be trivially extended to the case that correctness holds with overwhelming probability (i.e.,
failure occurs with negligible probability).
22
Algorithm 7 Game G0
1: A← Zn×nq
2: X1 ← χn×lA
3: Y1 = bAX1ep
4: X2 ← χn×lB
5: ← {−q/2p . . . q/2p− 1}n×lA
6: Y2 = bATX2ep
7: Σ2 = b( qpY1 + )TX2ep
8:
(
K02,V
)← Con(Σ2, params)
9: K12 ← ZlA×lBm
10: b← {0, 1}
11: b′ ← A(A,Y1,Y2,Kb2,V)
Algorithm 8 Game G1
1: A← Zn×nq
2: X1 ← χn×lA
3: Y1 ← Zn×lAp
4: X2 ← χn×lB
5: ← {−q/2p . . . q/2p− 1}n×lA
6: Y2 = bATX2ep
7: Σ2 = b( qpY1 + )TX2ep
8:
(
K02,V
)← Con(Σ2, params)
9: K12 ← ZlA×lBm
10: b← {0, 1}
11: b′ ← A(A,Y1,Y2,Kb2,V)
Lemma 5.3. |Pr[T0]−Pr[T1]| < negl, under the indistinguishability between L(lA,n)χ and U(Zn×nq ×
Zn×lAp ).
Proof. Construct a distinguisherD, in Algorithm 25, who tries to distinguish L(lA,n)χ from U(Zn×nq ×
Zn×lAp ).
Algorithm 9 Distinguisher D
1: procedure D(A,B) . A ∈ Zn×nq ,B ∈ Zn×lAp
2: Y1 = B
3: X2 ← χn×lB
4: ← {−q/2p . . . q/2p− 1}n×lA
5: Y2 = bATX2ep
6: Σ2 = b( qpY1 + )TX2ep
7:
(
K02,V
)← Con(Σ2, params)
8: K12 ← ZlA×lBm
9: b← {0, 1}
10: b′ ← A(A,Y1,Y2,Kb2,V)
11: if b′ = b then
12: return 1
13: else
14: return 0
15: end if
16: end procedure
If (A,B) is subjected to L
(lA,n)
χ , then D perfectly simulates G0. Hence, Pr
[
D
(
L
(lA,n)
χ
)
= 1
]
=
Pr[T0]. On the other hand, if (A,B) is chosen uniformly at random from Zn×nq × Zn×lAp , which
is denoted as (AU ,BU ), then D perfectly simulates G1. So Pr[D(AU ,BU ) = 1] = Pr[T1]. Hence,
|Pr[T0]− Pr[T1]| =
∣∣∣Pr[D(L(lA,n)χ ) = 1]− Pr[D(AU ,BU ) = 1]∣∣∣ < negl.
23
Algorithm 10 Game G1
1: A← Zn×nq
2: X1,E1 ← χn×lA
3: Y1 ← Zn×lAq
4: X2 ← χn×lB
5: ← {−q/2p . . . q/2p− 1}n×lA
6: Y2 = bATX2ep
7: Σ2 = b( qpY1 + )TX2ep
8:
(
K02,V
)← Con(Σ2, params)
9: K12 ← ZlA×lBm
10: b← {0, 1}
11: b′ ← A(A,Y1,Y2,Kb2,V)
Algorithm 11 Game G2
1: A← Zn×nq
2: X1,E1 ← χn×lA
3: Y1 ← Zn×lAq
4: X2 ← χn×lB
5: ← {−q/2p . . . q/2p− 1}n×lA
6: Y2 ← Zn×lBp
7: Σ2 ← ZlA×lBp
8:
(
K02,V
)← Con(Σ2, params)
9: K12 ← ZlA×lBm
10: b← {0, 1}
11: b′ ← A(A,Y1,Y2,Kb2,V)
Lemma 5.4. |Pr[T1] − Pr[T2]| < negl, under the indistinguishability between L(lB ,n+lA)χ and
U(Z(n+lA)×nq × Z(n+lA)×lBp ).
Proof. As Y1 and  are subjected to uniform distribution in G1,
p
qY1 +  is subjected to uniform
distribution over Zn×lAq . Based on this observation, we construct the following distinguisher D′.
First observe that Y′1 = (
q
pY1 + ) ∈ Zn×lAq follows the uniform distribution U(Zn×lAq ), where
Y1 ← Zn×lAq and ← [−q/2p, q/2p− 1]n×lA . If (A′,B) is subject to L(lB ,n+lA)χ , A′ ← Z(n+lA)×nq
corresponds to A ← Zn×nq and Y′1 = qpY1 +  in G1; And S ← χn×lB in generating (A′,B)
corresponds to X2 ← χn×lB in G1. In this case, we re-write
B = bA′Sep =
⌊(
AT
Y′T1
)
X2
⌉
p
=
( bATX2ep
bY′T1 X2ep
)
=
(
Y2
Σ2
)
Hence Pr
[
D′
(
L
(lB ,n+lA)
χ
)
= 1
]
= Pr[T1].
On the other hand, if (A′,B) is subject to uniform distribution U(Z(n+lA)×nq × Z(n+lA)×lBp ),
then A,Y′1,Y2,Σ2 all are also uniformly random; So, the view of D′ in this case is the same
as that in game G2. Hence, Pr [D′ (A′,B) = 1] = Pr[T2] in this case. Then, |Pr[T1] − Pr[T2]| =
|Pr[D′(L(lB ,n+lA)χ ) = 1]− Pr[D′(U(Z(n+lA)×nq × Z(n+lA)×lBp )) = 1]| < negl.
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Algorithm 12 Distinguisher D′
1: procedure D′(A′,B) where A′ ∈ Z(n+lA)×nq ,B ∈ Z(n+lA)×lBp
2: Denote A′ =
(
AT
Y′T1
)
. A ∈ Zn×nq ,Y′T1 = ( qpY1 + )T ∈ ZlA×nq
3: Denote B =
(
Y2
Σ2
)
. Y2 ∈ Zn×lBp ,Σ2 ∈ ZlA×lBp
4:
(
K02,V
)← Con(Σ2, params)
5: K12 ← ZlA×lBm
6: b← {0, 1}
7: b′ ← A(A, bY′1ep,Y2,Kb2,V)
8: if b′ = b then
9: return 1
10: else
11: return 0
12: end if
13: end procedure
Lemma 5.5. If the underlying KC or AKC is secure, Pr[T2] = 12 .
Proof. Note that, in Game G2, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ lA and 1 ≤ j ≤ lB,
(
K02[i, j],V[i, j]
)
only depends
on Σ2[i, j], and Σ2 is subject to uniform distribution. By the security of KC, we have that, for
each pair (i, j), K02[i, j] and V[i, j] are independent, and K
0
2[i, j] is uniform distributed. Hence,
K02 and V are independent, and K
0
2 is uniformly distributed, which implies that Pr[T2] = 1/2.
This finishes the proof of Theorem C.1.
5.3 Parameter Selection and Evaluation
In this subsection, the concrete parameters for key exchange protocol from LWR are evaluated
and chosen.
5.3.1 Discrete Distribution
It is suggested in [ADPS16, BCD+16] that rounded Gaussian distribution can be replaced by
discrete distribution that is very close to rounded Gaussian in the sense of Re´nyi divergence
[BLL+15].
Definition 5.2 ( [BLL+15]). For two discrete distributions P,Q satisfying Supp(P ) ⊆ Supp(Q),
their a-order Re´nyi divergence, for some a > 1, is
Ra(P ||Q) =
 ∑
x∈Supp(P )
P (x)a
Q(x)a−1
 1a−1 .
Lemma 5.6 ( [BLL+15]). Letting a > 1, P and Q are two discrete distributions satisfying
Supp(P ) ⊆ Supp(Q), then we have
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Multiplicativity: Let P and Q be two distributions of random variable (Y1, Y2). For i ∈ {1, 2},
let Pi and Qi be the margin distribution of Yi over P and Q respectively. If Y1 and Y2,
under P and Q respectively, are independent, then
Ra(P ||Q) = Ra(P1||Q1) ·Ra(P2||Q2).
Probability Preservation: Let A ⊆ Supp(Q) be an event, then
Q(A) ≥ P (A) aa−1 /Ra(P ||Q).
Note that, when the underlying key derivation function KDF is modelled as a random oracle
(as in [BCD+16, ADPS16]), an attacker is considered to be successful only if it can recover
the entire consensus bits. Denote by E the event that a PPT attacker can successfully and
entirely recover the bits of K1 = K2. By Lemma 5.6, we have that Prrounded Gaussian[E] >
Prdiscrete[E]
a/(a−1)/Rn·(lA+lB)+lA·lBa (χ||φ¯), where φ¯ is the rounded Gaussian distribution, and χ is
the discrete distribution.
5.3.2 Proposed Parameters
dist. bits var.
probability of
order divergence
0 ±1 ±2 ±3 ±4 ±5
DR 16 1.70 19572 14792 6383 1570 220 17 500.0 1.0000396
DP 16 1.40 21456 15326 5580 1033 97 4 500.0 1.0000277
Table 1: Discrete distributions of every component in the LWR secret. We choose the standard
variances large enough to prevent potential combinational attacks.
n q p l m g distr. bw. err. |K|
Recommended 680 215 212 8 24 28 DR 16.39 2
−35 256
Paranoid 832 215 212 8 24 28 DP 20.03 2
−34 256
Table 2: Parameters for LWR-Based key exchange. “bw.” refers to the bandwidth in kilo-bytes.
“err.” refers to the overall error probability that is calculated by the algorithm developed in
Section 5.1. “|K|” refers to the length of consensus bits.
5.3.3 Security Estimation
Similar to [ADPS16, BCD+16, CKLS16], we only consider the primal and dual attacks [CN11,
SE94] adapted to the LWR problem.
The dual attack tries to distinguish the distribution of LWE samples and the uniform dis-
tribution. Suppose (A,b = As + e) ∈ Zm×nq × Zmq is a LWE sample, where s and e are
drawn from discrete Gaussian of variance σ2s and σ
2
e respectively. Then we choose a positive real
c ∈ R, 0 < c ≤ q, and construct Lc(A) =
{
(x,y/c) ∈ Zm × (Z/c)n | xTA = yT mod q}, which
is a lattice with dimension m + n and determinant (q/c)n. For a short vector (x,y) ∈ Lc(A)
found by the BKZ algorithm, we have xTb = xT (As + e) = c · yT s + xTe mod q. If (A,b)
is an LWE sample, the distribution of the right-hand side will be very close to a Gaussian of
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standard deviation
√
c2‖y‖2σ2s + ‖x‖2σ2e , otherwise the distribution will be uniform. ‖(x,y)‖
is about δm+n0 (q/c)
n
m+n , where δ0 is the root Hermite factor. We heuristically assume that
‖x‖ =
√
m
m+n ‖(x,y)‖, and ‖y‖ =
√
n
m+n ‖(x,y)‖. Then we can choose c = σe/σs that min-
imizes the standard deviation of xTb. The advantage of distinguishing xTb from uniform distri-
bution is  = 4 exp(−2pi2τ2), where τ = √c2‖y‖2σ2s + ‖x‖2σ2e/q. This attack must be repeated
R = max{1, 1/(20.2075b2)} times to be successful.
The primal attack reduces the LWE problem to the unique-SVP problem. Let Λw(A) =
{(x,y, z) ∈ Zn × (Zm/w) × Z | Ax + wy = zb mod q}, and a vector v = (s, e/w, 1) ∈ Λw(A).
Λw(A) is a lattice of d = m+ n+ 1 dimensions, and its determinant is (q/w)
m. From geometry
series assumption, we can derive ‖b∗i ‖ ≈ δd−2i−10 det(Λw(A))1/d. We heuristically assume that
the length of projection of v onto the vector space spanned by the last b Gram-Schmidt vectors
is about
√
b
d ‖(s, e/w, 1)‖ ≈
√
b
d (nσ
2
s +mσ
2
e/w
2 + 1). If this length is shorter than ‖b∗d−b‖,
this attack can be successful. Hence, the successful condition is
√
b
d (nσ
2
s +mσ
2
e/w
2 + 1) ≤
δ2b−d−10
( q
w
)m/d
. We know that the optimal w balancing the secret s and the noise e is about
σe/σs.
We aim at providing parameter sets for long term security, and estimate the concrete security
in a more conservative way than [APS15] from the defender’s point of view. We first consider
the attacks of LWE whose secret and noise have different variances. Then, we treat the LWR
problem as a special LWE problem whose noise is uniformly distributed over [−q/2p, q/2p−1]. In
our security estimation, we simply ignore the difference between the discrete distribution and the
rounded Gaussian, on the following grounds: the dual attack and the primal attack only concern
about the standard deviation, and the Re´nyi divergence between the two distributions is very
small.
Scheme Attack m′ b C Q P
Recommended
Primal 667 461 143 131 104
Dual 631 458 142 130 103
Paranoid
Primal 768 584 180 164 130
Dual 746 580 179 163 129
Table 3: Security estimation of the parameters described in Table 2. “C, Q, P” stand for “Clas-
sical, Quantum, Plausible” respectively. Numbers under these columns are the binary logarithm
of running time of the corresponding attacks. Numbers under “m′, b” are the best parameters for
the attacks.
6 LWE-Based Key Exchange from KC and AKC
In this section, following the protocol structure in [Pei14,ADPS16,BCD+16], we present the appli-
cations of OKCN and AKCN to key exchange protocols based on LWE. Denote by (λ, n, q, χ,KC, lA, lB, t)
the underlying parameters, where λ is the security parameter, q ≥ 2, n, lA and lB are positive
integers that are polynomial in λ (for protocol symmetry, lA and lB are usually set to be equal
and are actually small constant). To save bandwidth, we cut off t least significant bits of Y2
before sending it to Alice.
Let KC = (params,Con,Rec) be a correct and secure KC scheme, where params is set to be
(q, g,m, d). The KC-based key exchange protocol from LWE is depicted in Figure 4, and the
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Initiator
seed← {0, 1}κ
A = Gen(seed) ∈ Zn×nq
X1,E1 ← χn×lA
Y1 = AX1 +E1
Responder
A = Gen(seed)
X2,E2 ← χn×lB
Y2 = A
TX2 +E2
Eσ ← χlA×lB
Σ2 = Y
T
1X2 +Eσ
(K2,V) ← Con(Σ2, params)
Σ1 = X
T
1 (2
tY′2 + 2
t−11)
K1 ← Rec(Σ1,V, params)
seed,Y1 ∈ Zn×lAq
Y′2 = ⌊Y2/2t⌋ ∈ Zn×lB⌈q/2t⌉,V ∈ ZlA×lBg
Figure 4: LWE-based key exchange from KC and AKC, where K1,K2 ∈ ZlA×lBm and |K1| =
|K2| = lAlB|m|. 1 refers to the matrix which every elements are 1.
actual session-key is derived from K1 and K2 via some key derivation function KDF . There,
for presentation simplicity, the Con and Rec functions are applied to matrices, meaning they are
applied to each of the coordinates separately. Note that 2tY′2 + 2t−11 is an approximation of Y2,
so we have Σ1 ≈ XT1 Y2 = XT1 ATX2+XT1 E2, Σ2 = YT1 X2+Eσ = XT1 ATX2+ET1 X2+Eσ. As we
choose X1,X2,E1,E2,Eσ according to a small noise distribution χ, the main part of Σ1 and that
of Σ2 are the same X
T
1 A
TX2. Hence, the corresponding coordinates of Σ1 and Σ2 are close in
the sense of | · |q, from which some key consensus can be reached. The failure probability depends
upon the number of bits we cut t, the underlying distribution χ and the distance parameter d,
which will be analyzed in detail in subsequent sections. In the following security definition and
analysis, we simply assume that the output of the PRG Gen is truly random. For presentation
simplicity, we have described the LWE-based key exchange protocol from a KC scheme. But it
can be straightforwardly adapted to work on any correct and secure AKC scheme, as clarified in
Section 5.
By a straightforward adaption (actually simplification) of the security proof of LWR-based key
exchange protocol in Section 5.2, we have the following theorem. The detailed proof of Theorem
6.1 is presented in Appendix C.
Theorem 6.1. If (params,Con,Rec) is a correct and secure KC or AKC scheme, the key exchange
protocol described in Figure 4 is secure under the (matrix form of) LWE assumption [PVW08,
BCD+16].
The correctness of the protocol depends upon the underlying error distributions, which are
discussed in the next subsection.
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6.1 Noise Distributions and Correctness
For a correct KC with parameter d, if the distance of corresponding elements of Σ1 and Σ2
is less than d in the sense of | · |q, then the scheme depicted in Figure 4 is correct. Denote
(Y2) = 2
tbY2/2tc+ 2t−11−Y2. Then
Σ1 −Σ2 = XT1 (2tY′2 + 2t−11)−YT1 X2 −Eσ
= XT1 (Y2 + (Y2))−YT1 X2 −Eσ
= XT1 (A
TX2 + E2 + (Y2))− (AX1 + E1)TX2 −Eσ
= XT1 (E2 + (Y2))−ET1 X2 −Eσ
We consider each pair of elements in matrix Σ1,Σ2 separately, then derive the overall error
rate by union bound. Now, we only need to consider the case lA = lB = 1. In this case,
Xi,Ei,Yi, (i = 1, 2) are column vectors in Znq , and Eσ ∈ Zq.
If Y2 is independent of (X2,E2), then we can directly calculate the distribution of σ1 − σ2.
But now Y2 depends on (X2,E2). To overcome this difficulty, we show that Y2 is independent
of (X2,E2) under a condition of X2 that happens with very high probability.
Theorem 6.2. For any positive integer q, n, and a column vector s ∈ Znq , let φs denote the map
Znq → Zq : φs(x) = xT s. If there exits a coordinate of s which is not zero divisor in ring Zq, then
map φs is surjective.
Proof. Let us assume one coordinate of s, say s, has no zero divisor in ring Zq. Then the Zq → Zq
map between the two Zq-modules deduced by s: x 7→ sx, is injective, and thus surjective. Hence,
φs is surjective.
For a column vector s composed by random variables, denote by F (s) the event that φs is
surjective. The following theorem gives a lower bound of probability of F (s), where s ← χn. In
our application, this lower bound is very close to 1.
Theorem 6.3. Let p0 be the probability that e is a zero divisor in ring Zq, where e is subject to
χ. Then Pr[s← χn : F (s)] ≥ 1− pn0
Proof. From Theorem 6.2, if φs is not surjective, then all coordinates of s are zero divisors. Then
Pr[s← χn : ¬F (s)] ≤ pn0 , and the proof is finished.
Theorem 6.4. If s, e ← χn,A ← Zn×nq ,y = As + e ∈ Znq , then under the condition F (s), y is
independent of (s, e), and is uniformly distributed over Znq .
Proof. For all y˜, s˜, e˜, Pr[y = y˜ | s = s˜, e = e˜, F (s)] = Pr[As˜ = y˜ − e˜ | s = s˜, e = e˜, F (s)]. Let
A = (a1,a2, . . . ,an)
T , y˜ − e˜ = (c1, c2, . . . , cn)T , where ai ∈ Znq , and ci ∈ Zq, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Since φs is surjective, the number of possible choices of ai, satisfying a
T
i · s˜ = ci, is |Kerφs| = qn−1.
Hence, Pr[As˜ = y˜ − e˜ | s = s˜, e = e˜, F (s)] = (qn−1)n/qn2 = 1/qn. Since the right-hand side is
the constant 1/qn, the distribution of y is uniform over Znq , and is irrelevant of (s, e).
We now begin to analyze the error probability of the scheme presented in Figure 4.
Denote by E the event |XT1 (E2+(Y2))−ET1 X2−Eσ|q > d. Then Pr[E] = Pr[E|F (S)] Pr[F (S)]+
Pr[E|¬F (S)] Pr[¬F (S)]. From Theorem 6.4, we replace Y2 = ATX2 + E2 in the event E|F (S)
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with uniformly distributed Y2. Then,
Pr[E] = Pr[Y2 ← Znq : E|F (S)] Pr[F (S)] + Pr[E|¬F (S)] Pr[¬F (S)]
= Pr[Y2 ← Znq : E|F (S)] Pr[F (S)] + Pr[Y2 ← Znq : E|¬F (S)] Pr[¬F (S)]
+ Pr[E|¬F (S)] Pr[¬F (S)]− Pr[Y2 ← Znq : E|¬F (S)] Pr[¬F (S)]
= Pr[Y2 ← Znq : E] + 
where || ≤ Pr[¬F (S)]. In our application, p0 is far from 1, and n is very large, by Theorem 6.3,
 is very small, so we simply ignore . If Y2 is uniformly distributed, then (Y2) is a centered
uniform distribution. Then, the distribution of XT1 (E2 + (Y2)) − ET1 X2 − Eσ can be directly
computed by programs.
As noted in [ADPS16,BCD+16], sampling from rounded Gaussian distribution (i.e., sampling
from a discrete Gaussian distribution to a high precision) constitutes one of major efficiency
bottleneck. In this work, for LWE-based key exchange, we are mainly concerned with the following
two kinds of efficiently sampleable distributions.
6.1.1 Binary Distribution
Binary-LWE is a variation of LWE, where the noise distribution is set to be χ = U({0, 1}).
With respect to m = n · (1 + Ω(1/ log n)) samples and large enough polynomial q ≥ nO(1), the
hardness of binary-LWE is established in [MP13], with a reduction from some approximation
lattice problem in dimension Θ(n/ log n). Concrete error probability can be calculated on the
concrete parameters by the method in previous section.
For KC-based key exchange from binary-LWE, we have the following theorem, which means
that it is correct when the underlying parameter d satisfies d ≥ n+ 1. For LWE-based KE from
OKCN, where 2md < q, we get that it is correct when q > 2m(n+ 1). Actually, this theorem has
already been implied in the above analysis.
Theorem 6.5. If χ = U({0, 1}), and (params,Con,Rec) is a correct KC or AKC scheme where
d ≥ n+ 1, the key exchange protocol described in Algorithm 4 is correct.
Proof. We prove that, for any (i, j), 1 ≤ i ≤ lA and 1 ≤ j ≤ lB, |Σ1[i, j]−Σ2[i, j]|q ≤ d holds
true. Denote X1 = (Xˆ1, Xˆ2, . . . , XˆlA), E1 = (Eˆ1, Eˆ2, . . . , EˆlA), and X2 = (Xˆ
′
1, Xˆ
′
2, . . . , Xˆ
′
lB
),
E2 = (Eˆ
′
1, Eˆ
′
2, . . . , Eˆ
′
lB
), where Xˆi, Xˆ
′
i, Eˆi, Eˆ
′
i ∈ {0, 1}n. Then
|Σ1[i, j]−Σ2[i, j]|q =
∣∣∣XˆTi Eˆ′j − EˆTi Xˆ′j −Eσ[i, j]∣∣∣
q
≤
∣∣∣XˆTi Eˆ′j − EˆTi Xˆ′j∣∣∣
q
+ |Eσ[i, j]|q
≤n+ 1 ≤ d
However, cautions should be taken when deploying key exchange protocols based upon binary-
LWE. By noting that any Binary-LWE sample satisfies a quadric equation, if no less than n2
samples can be used for an adversary, the secret and noise can be recovered easily. The work
[AG11] proposes an algorithm for binary-LWE with time complexity 2O˜(αq)
2
. If αq = o(
√
n),
this algorithm is subexponential, but it requires 2O˜((αq)
2) samples. When m log q/(n + m) =
o(n/ log n), [KF15] proposes a distinguishing attack with time complexity 2
n/2+o(n)
ln (m log q/(n+m)−1) , which
results in a subexponential-time algorithm if m grows linearly in n.
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6.1.2 Discrete Distributions
In this work, for LWE-based key exchange, we use the following two classes of discrete distribu-
tions, which are specified in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively, where “bits” refers to the number of
bits required to sample the distribution and “var.” means the standard variation of the Gaussian
distribution approximated. We remark that the discrete distributions specified in Table 5 are
just those specified and used in [BCD+16] for the LWE-based Frodo scheme.
dist. bits var.
probability of
order divergence
0 ±1 ±2 ±3 ±4 ±5
D1 8 1.10 94 62 17 2 15.0 1.0015832
D2 12 0.90 1646 992 216 17 75.0 1.0003146
D3 12 1.66 1238 929 393 94 12 1 30.0 1.0002034
D4 16 1.66 19794 14865 6292 1499 200 15 500.0 1.0000274
D5 16 1.30 22218 15490 5242 858 67 2 500.0 1.0000337
Table 4: Discrete distributions proposed in this work, and their Re´nyi divergences.
dist. bits var.
probability of
order divergence
0 ±1 ±2 ±3 ±4 ±5 ±6
D¯1 8 1.25 88 61 20 3 25.0 1.0021674
D¯2 12 1.00 1570 990 248 24 1 40.0 1.0001925
D¯3 12 1.75 1206 919 406 104 15 1 100.0 1.0003011
D¯4 16 1.75 19304 14700 6490 1659 245 21 1 500.0 1.0000146
Table 5: Discrete distributions for Frodo [BCD+16], and their Re´nyi divergences
q n l m
g d
dist.
error probability
bw. (kB) |A| (kB) |K|
OKCN Frodo OKCN Frodo OKCN Frodo
Challenge 210 334 8 21 29 2 255 127 D1 2
−47.9 2−14.9 6.75 139.45 64
Classical 211 554 8 22 29 2 255 127 D2 2
−39.4 2−11.5 12.26 422.01 128
Recommended 214 718 8 24 210 2 511 255 D3 2
−37.9 2−10.2 20.18 902.17 256
Paranoid 214 818 8 24 210 2 511 255 D4 2
−32.6 2−8.6 22.98 1170.97 256
Paranoid-512 212 700 16 22 210 2 511 255 D¯4 2
−33.6 2−8.3 33.92 735.00 512
Table 6: Parameters proposed for OKCN-LWE when t = 0 (i.e., without cutting off least signif-
icant bits). “distr.” refers to the discrete distributions proposed in Table 4 and Table 5. “bw.”
means bandwidth in kilo-bytes (kB). “|A|” refers to the size of the matrix. |K| = l2 logm denotes
the length of consensus bits.
q n l m
g d
dist.
error probability bw. (kB) |A| (kB) |K|
OKCN Frodo OKCN Frodo OKCN Frodo OKCN Frodo
Challenge 211 352 8 21 22 2 383 255 D¯1 2
−80.1 2−41.8 7.76 7.75 170.37 64
Classical 212 592 8 22 22 2 383 255 D¯2 2
−70.3 2−36.2 14.22 14.22 525.70 128
Recommended 215 752 8 24 23 2 895 511 D¯3 2
−105.9 2−38.9 22.58 22.57 1060.32 256
Paranoid 215 864 8 24 23 2 895 511 D¯4 2
−91.9 2−33.8 25.94 25.93 1399.68 256
Table 7: Parameters of Frodo, and comparison with OKCN-LWE when t = 0. Here, “distr.” refers
to the discrete distributions specified in Table 5. Note that, on the parameters of Frodo, OKCN-
LWE achieves significantly lower error probability, which are negligible and are thus sufficient for
building CPA-secure public-key encryption schemes.
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q n l m g t d dist. err. bw. (kB) |A| (kB) |K|
OKCN-T2 214 712 8 24 28 2 509 D5 2
−39.0 18.58 887.15 256
OKCN-T1 214 712 8 24 28 1 509 D5 2
−52.3 19.29 887.15 256
Table 8: Parameters proposed for OKCN-LWE with t least significant bits cut off.
6.1.3 Instantiations, and Comparisons with Frodo
The comparisons, between the instantiations of our LWE-based KE protocol and Frodo, are
summarized in the following tables 6, 7 and 8. Note that, for presentation simplicity, we take
lA = lB = l for the sets of parameters under consideration. Also, for presentation simplicity,
we use OKCN to denote OKCN-LWE in these tables. For both “OKCN simple” proposed in
Algorithm 3 and “AKCN power 2” proposed in Algorithm 5, they achieve a tight parameter
constraint, specifically, 2md < q. In comparison, the parameter constraint achieved by Frodo is
4md < q. As we shall see, such a difference is one source that allows us to achieve better trade-offs
among error probability, security, (computational and bandwidth) efficiency, and consensus range.
In particular, it allows us to use q that is one bit shorter than that used in Frodo. Beyond saving
bandwidth, employing a one-bit shorter q also much improves the computational efficiency (as
the matrix A becomes shorter, and consequently the cost of generating A and the related matrix
operations are more efficient), and can render stronger security levels simultaneously. Note that,
when being transformed into PKE schemes, smaller matrix A means shorter public-key size. Put
in other words, on the same parameters of (q,m), OKCN allows a larger error distance d than
Frodo, resulting in significantly lower error probability. Here, we briefly highlight one performance
comparision: OKCN-T2 (resp., Frodo-recommended) has 18.58kB (resp., 22.57kB) bandwidth,
887.15kB (resp., 1060.32kB) matrix A, at least 134-bit (resp., 130-bit) quantum security, and
error probability 2−39 (resp., 2−38.9).
The error probability for OKCN-LWE in these tables are derived by computing Pr
[
|Σ1[i, j]−Σ2[i, j]|q > d
]
,
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ lA and 1 ≤ j ≤ lB, and then applying the union bound. The concrete failure
probabilities are gotten by running the code slightly adjusted, actually simplified, from the open
source code of Frodo. The simplified code are available from Github http://github.com/OKCN.
6.1.4 Security Estimation
For security evaluation, similar to [ADPS16, BCD+16], we only consider the resistance to two
kinds of BKZ attacks, specifically primal attack and dual attack [CN11] [SE94], with respect
to the core-SVP hardness. The reader is referred to [ADPS16, BCD+16] for more details. The
concrete security levels are calculated by running the same code of Frodo. The evaluated security
levels are summarized in the following tables.
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Scheme Attack
Rounded Gaussian Post-reduction
m′ b C Q P C Q P
Challenge
Primal 327 275 – – – – – –
Dual 310 272 – – – – – –
Classical
Primal 477 444 138 126 100 132 120 95
Dual 502 439 137 125 99 131 119 94
Recommended
Primal 664 500 155 141 112 146 133 105
Dual 661 496 154 140 111 145 132 104
Paranoid
Primal 765 586 180 164 130 179 163 130
Dual 743 582 179 163 129 178 162 129
Paranoid-512
Primal 643 587 180 164 131 180 164 130
Dual 681 581 179 163 129 178 162 129
OKCN-T2
Primal 638 480 149 136 108 148 135 107
Dual 640 476 148 135 107 147 134 106
Table 9: Security estimation of the parameters described in Table 6 and Table 8. “C, Q, P” stand
for “Classical, Quantum, Plausible” respectively. Numbers under these columns are the binary
logarithm of running time of the corresponding attacks. Numbers under “m′, b” are the best
parameters for the attacks. “Rounded Gaussian” refers to the ideal case that noises and errors
follow the rounded Gaussian distribution. “Post-reduction” refers to the case of using discrete
distributions as specified in Table 4.
Scheme Attack
Rounded Gaussian Post-reduction
m′ b C Q P C Q P
Challenge
Primal 338 266 – – – – – –
Dual 331 263 – – – – – –
Classical
Primal 549 442 138 126 100 132 120 95
Dual 544 438 136 124 99 130 119 94
Recommended
Primal 716 489 151 138 110 145 132 104
Dual 737 485 150 137 109 144 130 103
Paranoid
Primal 793 581 179 163 129 178 162 129
Dual 833 576 177 161 128 177 161 128
Table 10: Security estimation of the parameters proposed for Frodo in [BCD+16], as specified in
Table 7.
7 Hybrid Construction of Key Exchange from LWE and LWR
in the Public-Key Setting
By composing a CPA-secure symmetric-key encryption scheme, the LWE-based key exchange
protocols presented Section 6 can be used to construct public-key encryption (PKE) schemes, by
treating (A,Y1) (resp., X1) as the static public key (resp., secret key). Moreover, AKC-based
key-exchange protocol can be directly used as a CPA-secure PKE scheme. To further improve
the efficiency of the resultant PKE scheme, the observation here is we can generate the ephemeral
Y2 in the ciphertext with LWR samples. This results in the following hybrid construction of key
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Initiator
seed← {0, 1}κ
A← ZnB×nAq
sk = X1 ← χnA×lA
E1 ← χnB×lA
Y1 = AX1 +E1 ∈ ZnB×lAq
Responder
A = Gen(seed)
X2 ← χnB×lB
Y2 = ⌊ATX2⌉p
Σ2 = ⌊YT1X2⌉p
V← Con(Σ2,K2, params)
Σ2 = X
T
1Y2 mod p
K1 ← Rec(Σ1,V, params)
pk = (A,Y1)
Y2 ∈ ZnA×lBp ,V ∈ ZlA×lBg
Figure 5: AKC-based key exchange from LWE and LWR in the public-key setting, where pk =
(A,Y1) is fixed once and for all, K1,K2 ∈ ZlA×lBm and |K1| = |K2| = lAlB|m|.
exchange from LWE and LWR in the public-key setting. For applications to PKE, we focus on the
AKC-based protocol construction. Denote by (nA, nB, lA, lB, q, p,KC, χ) the system parameters,
where p|q, and we choose p and q to be power of 2. The AKC-based protocol from LWE and
LWR is presented in Figure 5.
The hybird construction of key exchange from LWE and LWR is similar to the underlying
protocol in Lizard [CKLS16]. The Lizard PKE scheme uses our AKCN as the underlying rec-
onciliation mechnism (see more details in Appendix F), while our protocol is a general structure
that can be implemented with either KC or AKC. In order to improve efficiency, Lizard [CKLS16]
is based on the variants, referred to as spLWE and spLWR, of LWE and LWR with sparse secret.
We aim at providing parameter sets for long term security, and estimate the concrete security in
a more conservative way than [CKLS16] from the defender’s point of view.
7.1 Security and Error Rate Analysis
The security proof is very similar to LWE-basd and LWR-based key exchanges in previous sec-
tions, and is omitted here.
For the error probability, we have
Σ1 = X
T
1 Y2 =
p
q
XT1
(
ATX2 − {ATX2}p
)
=
p
q
(
XT1 A
TX2 −XT1 {ATX2}p
)
Σ2 =
⌊
YT1 X2
⌉
p
=
p
q
(
YT1 X2 − {YT1 X2}p
)
=
p
q
(XT1 A
TX2 + E
T
1 X2 − {YT1 X2}p)
Σ2 −Σ1 = p
q
(
ET1 X2 + X
T
1 {ATX2}p − {ET1 X2 + XT1 ATX2}p
)
= bET1 X2 + XT1 {ATX2}pep
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We can see that the distribution of Σ2 −Σ1 can be derived from the distribution of E1X2 +
XT1 {ATX2}p. From Theorem 6.4, we know that for almost all (with overwhelm probability) given
X2, the distribution of {ATX2}p is the uniform distribution over [−q/2p, q/2p)nA . The concrete
error probability can then be derived numerically by computer programs. The codes and scripts
are available on Github http://github.com/OKCN.
7.2 Parameter Selection
For simplicity, we use the Gaussian distribution of the same variance (denote as σ2s) for the noise
E1, secrets X1 and X2. We consider the weighted dual attack and weighted primal attack in
Section 5.3.
σ2s nA nB q p l m g pk cipher err. |K|
Recommended 2.0 712 704 215 212 8 24 28 10.56 8.61 2−63 256
Paranoid 2.0 864 832 215 212 8 24 28 12.24 10.43 2−52 256
Table 11: Parameters for the hybrid construction of key exchange from LWE and LWR. “err.”
refers to the overall error probability. “|K|” refers to the length of consensus bits. “pk” refers to
the kilo-byte (kB) size of the public key pk = (A,Y1). “cipher” refers to the kB size of (Y2,V).
Scheme Attack
LWE LWR
m′ b C Q P m′ b C Q P
Recommended
Primal 699 464 144 131 105 664 487 151 138 109
Dual 672 461 143 131 104 665 483 150 137 109
Paranoid
Primal 808 590 181 165 131 856 585 180 164 130
Dual 789 583 179 163 130 765 579 178 162 129
Table 12: Security estimation of the parameters described in Table 11.
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8 RLWE-Based Key Exchange from KC and AKC
Initiator
seed← {0, 1}κ
a = Gen(seed) ∈ Rq
x1, e1 ← DZn,α
y1 = a · x1 + e1
Responder
a = Gen(seed)
x2, e2 ← DZn,α
y2 = a · x2 + e2
eσ ← DZn,α
σ2 = y1 · x2 + eσ ∈ Rq
(k2,v)← Con(σ2, params)
σ1 = y2 · x1 ∈ Rq
k1 ← Rec(σ1,v, params)
seed,y1 ∈ Rq
y2 ∈ Rq,v ∈ Rg
Figure 6: RLWE-based key exchange from KC and AKC, where K1,K2 ∈ Rq. The protocol
instantiated with OKCN specified in Algorithm 1 (resp., AKCN in Algorithm 4) is referred to as
OKCN-RLWE (resp., AKCN-RLWE).
Denote by (λ, n, q, α,KC) the system parameters, where λ is the security parameter, q ≥ 2 is a
positive prime number, α parameterizes the discrete Gaussian distribution DZn,α, n denotes the
degree of polynomials in Rq, and Gen a PRG generating a ∈ Rq from a small seed.
Let KC = (params,Con,Rec) be a correct and secure KC scheme, where params = (q, g,m, d).
The KC-based key exchange protocol from RLWE is depicted in Figure 6, where the actual
session-key is derived from K1 and K2 via some key derivation function KDF . There, for
presentation simplicity, the Con and Rec functions are applied to polynomials, meaning they are
applied to each of the coefficients respectively. Note that σ1 = y2 · x1 = a · x2 · x1 + e2 · x1,
σ2 = y1 · x2 + eσ = a · x1 · x2 + e1 · x2 + eσ. As we choose x1,x2, e1, e2, eσ according to a
small noise distribution DZn,α, the main part of σ1 and that of σ2 are the same a · x1 · x2.
Hence, the corresponding coordinates of σ1 and σ2 are close in the sense of | · |q, from which
some key consensus can be reached. The error probability depends upon the concrete value of
α and the distance parameter d. As discussed in Section 5, a KC-based key exchange protocol
can be trivially extended to work on any correct and secure AKC scheme. As the bandwidth
of RLWE-based KE protocol has already been low, we do not apply the technique of cutting off
some least significant bits of each element of the polynomial y2.
On security analysis. The security definition and proof of the RLWE-based key exchange
protocol can be straightforwardly adapted from those for the KE protocol based on LWE or
LWR. Briefly speaking, from Game G0 to Game G1, we replace y1 with a uniformly random
polynomial in Rq. From Game G1 to Game G2, we replace y2 and σ2 with uniformly random
polynomials. Then, from the security of the underlying KC or AKC, we get that for any i,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, K2[i] and v[i] are independent, and so the protocol is secure.
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On implementations of RLWE-based KE. The protocol described in Figure 6 works on any hard
instantiation of the RLWE problem. But if n is power of 2, and prime q satisfies q mod 2n = 1,
then number-theoretic transform (NTT) can be used to speed up polynomial multiplication. The
performance can be further improved by using the Montgomery arithmetic and AVX2 instruction
set [ADPS16], and by carefully optimizing performance-critical routines (in particular, NTT) in
ARM assembly [AJS16].
For all the implementations considered in this work for RLWE-based KE, we use the same
parameters and noise distributions proposed for NewHope in [ADPS16], as described in Table 13.
They achieve about 281-bit (resp., 255-, 199-) security against classic (resp., quantum, plausible)
attacks. The reader is referred to [ADPS16] for details. In particular, the underlying noise
distribution is the centered binomial distribution Ψ16 (rather than rounded Gaussian distribution
with the standard deviation
√
8), which can be rather trivially sampled in hardware and software
with much better protection against timing attacks.
8.1 RLWE-Based Key Exchange with Negligible Error Rate
When implemented with the same parameters proposed in [ADPS16] for NewHope, as shown in
Table 13 OKCN-RLWE and AKCN-RLWE reach 1024 consensus bits, with a failure probability
around 2−40 that, we suggest, suffices for most applications of key exchange. In order for reaching
a negligible error probability, particularly for achieving a CPA-secure PKE scheme, we need to
further lower the error probability.
A straightforward approach to reducing the error probability is to use the technique of
NewHope by encoding and decoding the four-dimensional lattice D˜4. With such an approach,
the error probability can be lowered to about 2−61, but the shared-key size is reduced from 1024
to 256. AKCN-RLWE equipped with this approach, referred to as AKCN-4:1, is presented and
analyzed in Appendix D. We note that, in comparison with NewHope-simple recently proposed
in [ADPS16b], AKCN-4:1 still has (slight) performance advantage in bandwidth expansion; specif-
ically expanding 256 bits by AKCN-4:1 vs. 1024 bits by NewHope-simple compared to that of
NewHope.5
Decoding the 24-dimensional Leech lattice is also recently considered in [Pop16]. But decoding
the 4-dimensional lattice D˜4 has already been relatively complicated and computationally less
efficient. Another approach is to employ error correction code (ECC). Unfortunately, in general,
the ECC-based approach can be more inefficient and overburdened than NewHope’s approach.
In this work, we make a key observation on RLWE-based key exchange, by proving that the
errors in different positions in the shared-key are independent when n is large. Based upon this
observation, we present a super simple and fast code, referred to as single-error correction (SEC)
code, to correct at least one bit error. By equipping OKCN/AKCN with the SEC code, we achieve
the simplest RLWE-based key exchange from both OKCN and AKCN, referred to as OKCN-SEC
and AKCN-SEC respectively, with negligible error probability for much longer shared-key size.
The comparisons among these RLWE-based protocols are summarized in Table 13. We note
that for RLWE-based KE with negligible error probability, in general, AKC-based protocols are
relatively simpler than KC-based protocols.
5The bandwidth expansion, for both AKCN-4:1 and NewHope-simple, can be further compressed but at the
price of losing operation simplicity.
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g d |K| bw.(B) per. nH err.
SKCN-RLWE 24 2879 1024 4128 2−48 - 2−38
SKCN-RLWE 26 3023 1024 4384 2−52 - 2−42
AKCN-RLWE 24 2687 1024 4128 2−42 - 2−32
AKCN-RLWE 26 2975 1024 4384 2−51 - 2−41
SKCN-SEC 22 2303 765 3904 2−31 4 2−48
SKCN-SEC 23 2687 765 4032 2−42 4 2−70
SKCN-SEC 23 2687 837 4021 2−42 5 2−69
AKCN-SEC 24 2687 765 4128 2−42 4 2−70
AKCN-SEC 24 2687 837 4128 2−42 5 2−69
NewHope 22 - 256 3872 2−69 - 2−61
AKCN-4:1-RLWE 22 - 256 3904 2−69 - 2−61
Table 13: Comparisons with NewHope. All schemes in the table use the same noise distribution
Ψ16 used in [ADPS16], i.e. the sum of 16 independent centered binomial variables. And all
schemes in the table share the parameter (q = 12289, n = 1024,m = 21). |K| refers to the total
binary length of consensus bits. bw. (B) refers to the bandwidth in bytes. err. refers to failure
probability. “nH” refers to the dimension of SEC code used. “per” refers to the per bit error rate
before applying the SEC code. “err.” refers to overall error rate.
8.2 On the Independence of Errors in Different Positions
Suppose f(x), g(x) are two polynomials of degree n, whose coefficients are drawn independently
from Gaussian. Let h(x) = f(x) · g(x) ∈ R[x]/(xn + 1). We show that for every two different
integers 0 ≤ c1, c2 < n, the joint distribution of (h[c1], h[c2]) will approach to the two-dimensional
Gaussian when n tends to infinity. Hence, for the basic construction of RLWE-based key exchange
from KC and AKC presented in Figure 6, it is reasonable to assume that the error probability of
any two different positions are independent when n is sufficiently large.
For representation simplicity, for any polynomial f , let f [i] denote the coefficient of xi.
Lemma 8.1. Suppose f(x), g(x) ∈ R[x]/(xn + 1) are two n-degree polynomials whose coefficients
are drawn independently from N (0, σ2). Let h(x) = f(x) · g(x) ∈ R[x]/(xn + 1), where h(x)
is represented as an n-degree polynomial. For any two different integers 0 ≤ c1, c2 < n, the
characteristic function of the two-dimensional random vector (h[c1], h[c2]) ∈ R2 is
φc1,c2(t1, t2) = E
[
ei(t1h[c1]+t2h[c2])
]
=
n−1∏
k=0
(
1 + σ4
(
t21 + t
2
2 + 2t1t2 cos
(
pi(c1 − c2)2k + 1
n
)))− 1
2
(5)
Proof. One can observe that
t1h[c1] + t2h[c2] = t1
 ∑
i+j=c1
f [i]g[j]−
∑
i+j=c1+n
f [i]g[j]
+ t2
 ∑
i+j=c2
f [i]g[j]−
∑
i+j=c2+n
f [i]g[j]

= t1f
TAc1g + t2f
TAc2g = f
T (t1Ac1 + t2Ac2)g
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Where f = (f [0], f [1], . . . , f [n − 1])T , g = (g[0], g[1], . . . , g[n − 1])T , and the notations Ac1 ,Ac2
are defined by
Ac =

1
...
1
−1
...
−1

The value 1 in the first row is in the c-th column.
As t1Ac1 + t2Ac2 is symmetric, it can be orthogonally diagonalize as P
TΛP, where P is or-
thogonal, and Λ is diagonal. Hence, φc1,c2(t1, t2) = E[exp(i(Pf)TΛ(Pg))]. Since P is orthogonal,
it keeps the normal distribution unchanged. Hence, (Pf)TΛ(Pg) equals to the sum of n scaled
products of two independent one-dimensional Gaussian.
Suppose λ1, λ2, . . . , λn are the eigenvalues of t1Ac1+t2Ac2 , and φ is the characteristic function
of the product of two independent one-dimensional standard Gaussian. Then we have
φc1,c2(t1, t2) =
n−1∏
k=0
φ(σ2λk) (6)
From [Sim02], φ(t) = (1 + t2)−1/2. For λk, we further observe that
(t1Ac1 + t2Ac2)
2 = (t21 + t
2
2)I + t1t2(Ac1Ac2 + Ac2Ac1)
= (t21 + t
2
2)I + t1t2(G
c2−c1 + Gc1−c2),
where
G =

1
1
. . .
1
−1

The characteristic polynomial of G is xn + 1. Hence, λk satisfies
λ2k = t
2
1 + t
2
2 + 2t1t2 cos
(
pi(c1 − c2)2k + 1
n
)
By taking this into Equation 6, we derive the Equation 5.
Theorem 8.1. For any fixed integers 0 ≤ c1, c2 < n, c1 6= c2, when n tends to infinity, the dis-
tribution of
(
h[c1]
σ2
√
n
, h[c2]
σ2
√
n
)
converges (in distribution) to the two-dimensional normal distribution
N (0, I2).
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Proof. Let φ(t1, t2) denote the characteristic function of the random vector
(
h[c1]
σ2
√
n
, h[c2]
σ2
√
n
)
. Then,
for fixed t1, t2,
ln(φ(t1, t2)) = −1
2
n−1∑
k=0
ln
(
1 +
1
n
(
t21 + t
2
2 + 2t1t2 cos
(
pi(c1 − c2)2k + 1
n
)))
(7)
= −1
2
n−1∑
k=0
[
1
n
(
t21 + t
2
2 + 2t1t2 cos
(
pi(c1 − c2)2k + 1
n
))
+ rk
]
(8)
= −1
2
(
t21 + t
2
2
)− 1
2
n−1∑
k=0
rk, (9)
where rk is the Lagrange remainders. So, |rk| ≤ λ4k/2n2. Since λ2k ≤ (|t1| + |t2|)2, we have
|rk| ≤ (|t1|+ |t2|)4/2n2.
When n tends to infinity, φ(t1, t2) converges pointwise to exp(−(t21 + t22)/2), which is the char-
acteristic function of the two-dimensional normal distribution N (0, I2). From Le´vy’s convergence
theorem, we derive that the random vector
(
h[c1]
σ2
√
n
, h[c2]
σ2
√
n
)
converges in distribution to the normal
distribution N (0, I2).
8.3 Reducing Error Rate with Single-Error Correction Code
Note that, for the basic protocol construction of RLWE-based key exchange from KC and AKC
presented in Figure 6, it has already achieved per-bit error probability of about 2−42. The
observation here is that, by Theorem 8.1 on the independence of error in different positions
when n is large, if we can correct one bit error the error probability will be greatly lowered to
be negligible. Towards this goal, we present an variant of the Hamming code, referred to as
single-error correction (SEC) code, which can correct one-bit error in a very simple and fast way.
8.3.1 Single-Error Correction Code
All the arithmetic operations in this section are over Z2. For a positive integer nH , denote
NH = 2
nH , and define the matrix H as following, where for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ NH − 1, the i-th
column of H just corresponds to the binary presentation of i.
HnH×(NH−1) =

1 0 1 0 1 0 1 · · · 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 · · · 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 · · · 1 1 1 1
· · ·
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 1 1 1 1

For arbitrary x = (x1, . . . , xNH−1) ∈ ZNH−12 , let pT = HxT . It is easy to check that the j-th
element of p is the exclusive-or of all xi’s satisfying the j-th least significant bit of i is 1, where
1 ≤ j ≤ nH and 1 ≤ i ≤ NH − 1. Specifically, the first element of p is the exclusive-or of all xi
that the least significant bit of i is 1, and the second element of p is the exclusive-or of all xi
that the second least significant bit of i is 1, and so on. Denote p = (p1, p2, . . . , pnH ). We can
combine the bits in p into a binary number p = 20p1 + 2
1p2 + . . . 2
nH−1pnH . The construction of
H directly leads to the following proposition.
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Proposition 8.1. If pT = HxT , and the Hamming weight of x is 1, then p is the subscript index
of the only 1 in x.
The single-error correction code C is defined by
C =
{
(x0,x,p) ∈ Z2 × ZNH−12 × ZnH2 | x0 = ⊕NH−1i=1 xi,pT = HxT
}
The encoding algorithm is straightforward and depicted in Algorithm 13.
We now show that C can correct one bit error. Suppose x is encoded into c = (x0,x,p). For
some reasons, such as the noise in communication channel, the message c may be changed into
c′ = (x′0,x′,p′). We only need to consider the case that at most one bit error occurs. If x′0 equals
to the parity bit of x′, then no error occurs in x0 and x. Otherwise, there is one bit error in x′0
or x′, but p′ = p (as we assume there exists at most one bit error that has already occurred in
x′0 or x′). We calculate p′′ = Hx′T ⊕p′T . In fact, p′′ = Hx′T ⊕pT = H(x′T ⊕xT ). If the one-bit
error occurs in x′, by Proposition 8.1, p′′ is the subscript index of the error bit. If the one-bit
error occurs on x′0, then x′ = x, and p′′ = H0 = 0. Hence, p′′ always equals to the subscript
index of the error bit.
The decoding algorithm is depicted in Algorithm 14. Note that, according to the special form
of H, the matrix multiplication HxT in both encoding and decoding can be done with simple bit
operations like bit shifts and bitwise exclusive-or (such an implementation is given in Appendix
E). Moreover, for AKCN-SEC and OKCN-SEC, the calculations in Lines 2-4 in Algorithm 14 are
executed only with probability around 2−40, so the decoding is extremely fast.
Algorithm 13 EncodeC(x = (x1, . . . , xNH−1))
1: x0 = ⊕NH−1i=1 xi
2: pT = HxT
3: c = (x0,x,p)
4: return c
Algorithm 14 DecodeC(x0,x =
(x1, . . . , xNH−1),p)
1: p = ⊕NH−1i=0 xi
2: if p = 1 then
3: i = HxT ⊕ p . bitwise exclusive-or
4: xi = xi ⊕ 1
5: end if
6: return x
8.3.2 AKC and KC with SEC code
We divide the n-bit string k1 into bn/(NH +nH)c blocks, then apply our SEC code in each block.
Note that this approach can also correct more than one bit errors, if at most one bit error occurs
in each block.
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Alice
σ1 ∈ Znq
k1 = EncodeC(k′1)
v← Con(σ1,k1, params)
Bob
σ2 ∈ Znq
k2 ← Rec(σ2,v, params)
k′2 = DecodeC(k2)
v
≈
Figure 7: Depiction of AKC with SEC code, where k1,k2 ∈ ZNH+nH2 , |k′1| = |k′2| = NH − 1. If
the Hamming distance between k1 and k2 is at most 1, then k
′
1 = k
′
2.
Figure 7 depicts the AKC scheme equipped with the SEC code. Note that EncodeC can
be calculated off-line. Suppose the per bit error probability of k1 and k2 is p, then under the
assumption that the errors in different positions are independent, we can estimate that the overall
heuristic error probability of k′1 and k′2 is no larger than b nNH+nH cC2NH+nHp2.
Alice
σ1 ∈ ZNH+nHq
(k1,v)← Con(σ1, params)
Denote k1 as (x0,x = (x1, . . . , xNH−1),p)
v′ = EncodeC(x)⊕ k1
Bob
σ2 ∈ ZNH+nHq
k2 ← Rec(σ2,v, params)
Denote k2 as (x
′
0,x
′ = (x′1, . . . , x
′
NH−1),p
′)
x′ = DecodeC(k2 ⊕ v′)
v,v′ ∈ V
≈
Figure 8: Depiction of application of SEC code to KC, where k1,k2 ∈ ZNH+nH2 . If k1 and k2
have at most one different bit, then x = x′.
For KC equipped with the SEC code, we propose the algorithm depicted in Figure 8. Note
that Alice only needs to send nH +1 bits of v
′, as the second to NHth elements of v′ are all zeros.
Bob calculates x′ = DecodeC(k2 ⊕ v′). In fact, k2 ⊕ v′ = EncodeC(x) ⊕ (k1 ⊕ k2). Hence, if the
Hamming distance between k1 and k2 is 1, then x
′ = x. To prove security of the algorithm in
Figure 8, we need the following theorem.
Theorem 8.2. Let V = Z2 × {0 ∈ ZNH−12 } × ZnH2 , then ZNH+nH2 = C
⊕V, where ⊕ denotes
direct sum.
Proof. For any k1 = (x0,x = (x1, . . . , xNH−1),p) ∈ ZNH+nH2 , let c = EncodeC(x) and v′ = c⊕k1.
We have the decomposition k1 = c⊕ v′, where c ∈ C and v′ ∈ V.
Next, we prove V ∩ C = 0. If k = (x0,x,p) ∈ V ∩ C, then x = 0, which implies x0 = 0 and
pT = H0 = 0. Hence, k = 0.
When k1 is subjected to uniform distribution, then by Theorem 8.2, after the decomposition
k1 = c ⊕ v′ where c ∈ C and v′ ∈ V, c and v′ are subjected to uniform distribution in C and
V respectively. And c and v′ are independent. As both ZNH−12 → C and x 7→ EncodeC(x)
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are one-to-one correspondence, we derive that x and v′ are independent, and x is uniformly
distributed.
On the desirability of OKCN-SEC and AKCN-SEC. OKCN-SEC and AKCN-SEC are
desirable on the following grounds:
• To our knowledge, OKCN-SEC and AKCN-SEC are the simplest RLWE-based KE pro-
tocols with negligible error probability, which are better suitable for hardware or software
implementations than encoding and decoding the four-dimensional lattice D˜4. Note that
SEC can be implemented with simple bit operations. Moreover, with probability about
1− 2−40, the decoding only involves the XOR operations in Line-1 of Algorithm 13, which
is extremely simple and fast.
• AKCN-SEC can be directly transformed into a CPA-secure PKE scheme for encrypting
837-bit messages with error probability about 2−69, while AKCN4:1-RLWE and NewHope-
simple are for encrypting 256-bit messages with error probability about 2−61.
• It is desirable to have KE protocols that directly share or transport keys of larger size,
on the following grounds. Firstly, it is commonly expected that, in the post-quantum
era, symmetric-key cryptographic primitives like AES need larger key sizes, in view of the
quadratic speedup by Grover’s search algorithm and the possibility of more sophisticated
quantum attacks [KM10, KLL15] against symmetric-key cryptography. Secondly, in some
more critical application areas than public commercial usage, larger key size actually has
already been mandated nowadays. Thirdly, when KE being used within TLS, actually
a pair of keys (KCS ,KSC), and even more, is needed, where KCS (resp., KSC) is for
generating messages from client (resp., server) to server (resp., client). (KCS ,KSC) is
usually derived via a key-derivation function (KDF) from the session-key output by the KE
protocol. With a KE protocol of larger shared-key size, the KDF can be waived, which
simplifies the software or hardware implementations (particularly at the client side) and
strengthens security simultaneously.
• As clarified, the SEC approach fails only when there are more than one bit errors in some
block, and is versatile in the sense: the smaller (resp., larger) is the block size nH , the lower
the error probability (resp., bandwidth expansion) will be. The performances for some
instantiations of OKCN-SEC and AKCN-SEC are summarized in Table 13.
9 Performance Comparison: Benchmark
The work [SM16] introduces the Open Quantum Safe Project. liboqs is one part of this project.
liboqs provides the interface for adding new key exchange schemes, benchmark, and an easy way
to integrate to OpenSSL.
We fork the liboqs on Github and add our OKCN-LWR-Recommended and OKCN-LWE-
Recommended. Most of the source codes are modified from Frodo-Recommended provided in
liboqs.
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time(us) stdev cycle stdev bw. (B)
RLWE BCNS15
Alice 0 1006.497 10.909 2309859 24996 4096
Bob 1623.353 14.045 3725552 32220 4244
Alice 1 201.335 1.268 461976 2805 -
RLWE NewHope
Alice 0 81.430 26.947 186797 61827 1824
Bob 123.714 4.504 283841 10279 2048
Alice 1 26.631 1.878 61048 4173 -
LWE Frodo recommended
Alice 0 1443.915 10.990 3313704 25236 11280
Bob 1940.616 12.809 4453734 29439 11288
Alice 1 170.109 3.655 390331 8317 -
LWR OKCN recommended
Alice 0 1161.154 11.839 2664789 27129 9968
Bob 1722.525 12.401 3953182 28400 8224
Alice 1 133.984 3.980 307404 9065 -
LWE OKCN recommended
Alice 0 1335.453 13.460 3064789 30871 9968
Bob 1753.240 14.293 4023632 32851 8608
Alice 1 146.162 3.528 335380 8035 -
Table 14: Benchmark of liboqs integrated with OKCN-LWE-Recommended. “time(us)” refers to
mean time that spent on each iteration. “cycle” refers to mean number of cpu cycles. “stdev”
refers to population standard deviation of time or cpu cycles. “bw. (B)” refers to bandwidth,
counted in bytes.
We run benchmark of liboqs on Ubuntu Linux 16.04, GCC 5.4.0, Intel Core i7-4712MQ
2.30GHz, with hyperthreading and TurboBoost disabled, and the CPU frequency fixed to 2.30GHz
(by following the instructions on http://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html). The benchmark
result (Table 14) shows that OKCN-LWR-Recommended and OKCN-LWE-Recommended are
faster than Frodo, and use smaller bandwidth.
We modify the source code of NewHope. We only change the reconciliation part of NewHope
to our OKCN/AKCN, and keep other parts (e.g. NTT) unchanged. The benchmark of our
RLWE-AKCN-SEC and RLWE-OKCN-SEC are shown in Table 15. The environment is the same
as above. We can see that the simplicity of our reconciliation mechanisms result in significant
improvement of this part in the key exchange scheme.
AKCN-SEC OKCN-SEC NewHope
con
median 8032 12020 15276
average 8169 12093 15448
rec
median 7420 7356 10548
average 7625 7369 10498
Table 15: Benchmark of AKCN/OKCN-SEC and NewHope. Numbers in the table are median
and average of cpu cycles.
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10 More Applications and Future Works
The composition of a secure KE protocol (with negligible error probability) and a CPA-secure
symmetric-key encryption scheme (SKE) yields a CPA-secure PKE scheme. And any CPA-secure
PKE can be transformed into a CCA-secure one via the FO-transformation [FO13,FO99,Pei14,
TU15] in the quantum random oracle model. If we view 2−60 to be negligible, then OKCN-LWE
and AKCN-LWE (on the same parameters of Frodo), AKCN-4:1-RLWE (on the same parameters
of NewHope), and OKCN-SEC and AKCN-SEC can be used to build CPA-secure PKE schemes.
Moreover, AKCN-LWE, AKCN-4:1-RLWE, and AKCN-SEC can be used directly for CPA-secure
PKE scheme (without composing SKE).
One particularly important application of public-key cryptography is key transport (i.e.,
public-key encryption of a random symmetric key), which is in particular demanded by the
Tor project [Nic] and NIST [NIS]. We note that our AKC-based KE protocols can just be used
for key transport.
Any secure KE protocol can be transformed, in a black-box way, into an authenticated
key exchange (AKE) protocol by additionally using a secure signature scheme via the SIGMA
paradigm [Kra03]. SIGMA is just the basis of authentication mechanism for the secure trans-
port protocol TLS in the client/server setting. Recently, the next generation of TLS, specifically
TLS1.3, is now under development [Res]; And developing post-quantum secure TLS protocol is
now receiving more and more efforts or attention both from research community and from stan-
dardization agencies. Compared to the currently deployed TLS1.2 standard, one salient change
(among others) made in TLS1.3 is that the server now plays the role of the responder. The
heavy workload in the server, particularly at peak time, is one of the major sources that causes
slower server responsiveness or causes the server an easy target of more and more vicious DDoS
attacks. We suggest that the predicament faced by the server can be mitigated with AKC-based
KE protocols like AKCN-LWE, AKCN-4:1-RLWE, and AKCN-SEC, by taking advantage of the
session-key predetermination and online/offline parallel computability enjoyed by them. The
integration of the developed protocols into TLS is left to future works.
Finally, as a fundamental building tool for lattice-based cryptography, we suggest OKCN,
AKCN, and the various KE protocols based on them, are of independent value. They may possibly
find more applications in more advanced cryptographic primitives (e.g., oblivious transfer, IBE,
ABE, FHE) from LWR, LWE and RLWE, by simplifying their design and analysis with versatile
performance optimization or balance.
11 ZarZar: RLWE-Based Key Exchange from KC and AKC
Previously, [ADPS16] proposes practical RLWE key exchange NewHope, whose reconciliation
mechanism uses lattice D2. [ADPS16b] proposes a variant NewHope-Simple, which simplifies the
reconciliation mechanism of NewHope. However, the slowest part of NewHope and NewHope-
simple is the 1024-dimension Number Theoretic Transform (NTT). Hence, the simplification of
the reconciliation mechanism does not bring much improvement of the overall efficiency. [ADPS16]
also provides JarJar, which is a key exchange based on 512-dimension RLWE, and its reconcilia-
tion mechanism is based on D2. However, JarJar can only provide 118-bit security on best known
quantum attack from [ADPS16].
In this section, we propose a lightweight RLWE key exchange named ZarZar. ZarZar uses
lattice E8, which is in higher dimension and thus denser than D2. This allows us to choose smaller
dimension of RLWE with larger noise. NTT of 512-dimension in ZarZar costs nearly half of that
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of NewHope. Although the dimension of E8 is higher than D2, based on the structure of E8, we
propose fast encoding and decoding algorithms. To improve the efficiency of sampling noise of
large variance, we propose a fast sample method.
In our parameter set, n = 512. We divide the 512 coefficients of the polynomial σ1 and
σ2 into 64 groups, where each group is composed by 8 coefficients. In specific, denote R =
Z[x]/(x8 + 1), Rq = R/qR,K = Q[x]/(x8 + 1) and KR = K ⊗ R ' R[x]/(x8 + 1). Then the
polynomial σ1 can be represented as σ1(x) = σ0(x
64) + σ1(x
64)x + · · · + σ63(x64)x63, where
σi(x) ∈ Rq for i = 0, 1, . . . 63. σ2 can be divided in the same way. Then we only need to
construct the reconciliation mechanism for each σi(x), and finally combine the keys together. To
do this, we first need to introduce the lattice E8 and its encoding and decoding.
11.1 E8 and its Encoding and Decoding
We construct lattice E8 from the Extended Hamming Code in dimension 8, H8. H8 refers to the
4-dimension linear subspace of 8-dimension linear space Z82.
H8 = {c ∈ Z82 | c = zH mod 2, z ∈ Z4}
where
H =

1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1

The encoding algorithm is straightforward: given a 4-bit string k1, calculate k1H. This
operation can be done efficiently by bitwise operations. We combine this encoding with AKCN.
The complete algorithm is shown in Algorithm 15.
Algorithm 15 Con with encoding in E8
1: procedure Con(σ1 ∈ Z8q ,k1 ∈ Z42, params)
2: v =
⌊
g
q
(
σ1 +
q−1
2 (k1H mod 2)
)⌉
mod g
3: return v
4: end procedure
The decoding algorithm finds the solution of the closest vector problem (CVP) for the lattice
E8. For any given x ∈ R8, CVP asks which lattice point in E8 is closest to x. Based on the struc-
ture of E8, we propose an efficient decoding algorithm. Let C = {(x1, x1, x2, x2, x3, x3, x4, x4) ∈
Z82 | x1 +x2 +x3 +x4 = 0 mod 2}. In fact, C is spanned by the up most three rows of H. Hence,
E8 = C ∪ (C+ c), where c = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) is the last row of H. For a given x ∈ R8, to solve
CVP of x in E8, we solve CVP of x and x − c in C, and then choose the one that has smaller
distance.
Algorithm 16 Rec with decoding in E8
1: procedure Rec(σ2 ∈ Z8q ,v ∈ Z8g, params)
2: k2 = DecodeE8
(⌊
q
gv
⌉
− σ2
)
3: return k2
4: end procedure
46
Algorithm 17 Decoding in E8 and C
1: procedure DecodeE8(x ∈ Z8q)
2: for i = 0 . . . 7 do
3: costi,0 = |xi|2q
4: costi,1 = |xi + q−12 |2q
5: end for
6: (k00,TotalCost00)← Decode00C (costi∈0...7,b∈{0,1})
7: (k01,TotalCost01)← Decode01C (costi∈0...7,b∈{0,1})
8: if TotalCost00 < TotalCost01 then
9: b = 0
10: else
11: b = 1
12: end if
13: (k0, k1, k2, k3)← k0b
14: k2 = (k0, k1 ⊕ k0, k3, b)
15: return k2
16: end procedure
17: procedure Decodeb0b1C (costi∈0...7,b∈{0,1} ∈ Z8×2)
18: mind = +∞
19: mini = 0
20: TotalCost = 0
21: for j = 0 . . . 3 do
22: c0 ← cost2j,b0 + cost2j+1,b1
23: c1 ← cost2j,1−b0 + cost2j+1,1−b1
24: if c0 < c1 then
25: ki ← 0
26: else
27: ki ← 1
28: end if
29: TotalCost← TotalCost + cki
30: if c1−ki − cki < mind then
31: mind ← c1−ki − cki
32: mini ← i
33: end if
34: end for
35: if k0 + k1 + k2 + k3 mod 2 = 1 then
36: kmini ← 1− kmini
37: TotalCost← TotalCost +mind
38: end if
39: k = (k0, k1, k2, k3)
40: return (k,TotalCost)
41: end procedure
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Then we consider how to solve CVP in C. For an x ∈ R8, we choose (x1, x2, x3, x4) ∈ Z42, such
that (x1, x1, x2, x2, x3, x3, x4, x4) is closest to x. However, x1 +x2 +x3 +x4 mod 2 may equal to 1.
In such cases, we choose the 4-bit string (x′1, x′2, x′3, x′4) such that (x′1, x′1, x′2, x′2, x′3, x′3, x′4, x′4) is
secondly closest to x. Note that (x′1, x′2, x′3, x′4) has at most one-bit difference from (x1, x2, x3, x4).
The detailed algorithm is depicted in Algorithm 17. Considering potential timing attack, all the
“if” conditional statements can be implemented by constant time bitwise operations. In practice,
Decode00C and Decode
01
C are implemented as two subroutines.
For algorithm 17, in DecodeE8 , we calculate costi,b, where i = 0, 1, . . . , 7, b ∈ {0, 1}, which
refer to the contribution to the total 2-norm when xi = b. Decode
00
C solves the CVP in lattice C,
and Decode01C solves the CVP in lattice C+ c. Then we choose the one that has smaller distance.
Decodeb0b1C calculates the ki, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 such that
q−1
2 (k0⊕b0, k0⊕b1, k1⊕b0, k1⊕b1, k2⊕b0, k2⊕
b1, k3 ⊕ b0, k3 ⊕ b1) is closest to x. We use mind and mini to find the second closest vector.
Finally, we check the parity to decide which one should be returned.
The following theorem gives a condition of success of the encoding and decoding algorithm
in Algorithm 15 and Algorithm 16. For simplicity, for any σ = (x0, x1, . . . , x7) ∈ Z8q , we define
‖σ‖2q,2 =
∑7
i=0 |xi|2q .
Theorem 11.1. If ‖σ1−σ2‖q,2 ≤ (q−1)/2−
√
2
(
q
g + 1
)
, then k1 and k2 calculated by Con and
Rec are equal.
Proof. The minimal Hamming distance of the Extended Hamming code H8 is 4. Hence, the
minimal distance in the lattice we used is 12
√(
q−1
2
)2 × 4 = (q − 1)/2.
We can find , 1 ∈ [−1/2, 1/2]8,θ ∈ Z8 such that⌊
q
g
v
⌉
− σ2 = q
g
v + − σ2 = q
g
(
g
q
(
σ1 +
q − 1
2
k1H
)
+ + θg
)
+ 1 − σ2
= (σ1 − σ2) + q − 1
2
k1H +
q
g
+ 1 + θq
Hence, the bias from q−12 k1H is no larger than ‖σ1 − σ2‖q,2 + qg‖‖ +
√
2 ≤ ‖σ1 − σ2‖q,2 +√
2
(
q
g + 1
)
. If this value is less than the minimal distance (q−1)/2, the decoding will be correct,
which implies k1 = k2.
11.2 Parameters and Implementation
We shall explain why our key exchange based on E8 outperforms JarJar, which uses D2 in
[ADPS16]. E8 is densitest in 8-dimension, and it is denser than D2. Specifically, when E8 is
embeded into Z8q , the minimal distance of
q
2E8 is
q
2 , while the minimal distance of qD2 is
√
2
4 q.
Both E8 and D2 can extract 256-bit key from polynomial whose degree is 512. As we shall see in
Figure 9, the logarithm of probability is almost propotional to the square of the distance between
σ1 and σ2. Hence, the smaller minimal distance allows us to choose Gaussian of larger deviation
in secrets and noises, which garantees at least 128-bit post-quantum safty of the protocol.
Encoding and decoding in E8 may be more slower than D2, but we half the time of numerical
theoretic transform (NTT) compared to NewHope by setting n = 512. Note that the efficiency
of NTT dominates the overall efficiency. Hence, the trade off is worthwhile.
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11.2.1 Parameters
We choose the parameter (q = 12289, n = 512, σ2 = 22). See Table 16 for the security estima-
tion. The attack time estimation of NewHope seems much larger than our ZarZar. However, as
NewHope only reach 256-bit shared key. The post-quantum attacker may attack its symmetric
encryption in 128-bit time. In addition, the security level is estimated in a very conservative way.
The number 129 in column Q does not mean best known attack can achieve 2129 time.
m b C Q P
Primal 646 491 143 130 101
Dual 663 489 143 129 101
Table 16: Security estimation for ZarZar.
11.2.2 Noise distribution
NewHope uses the centered binary distribution Ψ16 as the secrete and noise distribution. However,
the deviation in our parameter set (σ =
√
22) is much larger than NewHope, this method requires
too many random bits. Note that the generation of random bits costs a lot of time. Frodo uses
a table to generate a discrete distribution that is very close to the rounded Gaussian. However,
in our parameter set, the table will be too large to sample efficiently. Hence, we propose the
distribution Ba,b, where a and b are two integers.
Algorithm 18 Sample r from Ba,b
1: r ←∑ai=1 getOneRandomBit() + 2 ∗∑bi=1 getOneRandomBit()− (a2 + b)
The variation of r in Algorithm 18 is a4 + b, and the expect value of r is 0. By the central limit
theorem, the distribution of r is close to a discrete Gaussian. In our implementation, we choose
a = 24, b = 16, and the summation of the random bits are calculated by fast bit counting.
n a P σ2 Ra(P ||Q) Ra(P ||Q)5n
ZarZar 512 30 B24,16 22 1.0016 65.71
NewHope 1024 9 Ψ16 8 1.00063 26
Table 17: Comparison of Renyi divergence. Q refers to the rounded Gaussian of variance σ2.
The closeness of B24,16 and the rounded Gaussian of variance 22 is measured in Table 17.
Recall that the Renyi divergence increase as a increase. Hence, B24,16 and rounded Gaussian of
variance 22 are more close compared to Ψ16 and rounded Gaussian of variance 8. We use a larger
a than NewHope so that the potential security decline can be smaller, although no attacks known
make use of the information of different noise distributions.
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11.2.3 Benchmark
ZarZar NewHope
NTT
median 26864 56056
average 27449 56255
NTT−1 median 28368 59356
average 28447 59413
sample noise
median 20876 33100
average 20909 33112
con/HelpRec
median 5760 15180
average 5786 15165
rec
median 10920 10516
average 10990 10515
Alice0
median 133646 249476
average 135550 250264
bandwidth (B) - 928 1824
Bob0
median 196478 386248
average 197840 387104
bandwidth (B) - 1280 2048
Alice1
median 48248 84880
average 48332 84940
Table 18: Benchmark of ZarZar and NewHope. Numbers in the table are median and average of
cpu cycles.
We run benchmark of ZarZar and NewHope on Ubuntu Linux 16.04, GCC 5.4.0, Intel Core
i7-4712MQ 2.30GHz, with hyperthreading and TurboBoost disabled. The benchmark result (Ta-
ble 18) shows that ZarZar essentially outperforms NewHope.
11.3 Error Rate Analysis
In this section, we propose a delicate analysis of the error probability. From the depiction of the
protocol, we know that σ1 − σ2 = y2x1 − (y1x2 + eσ) = e2x1 − e1x2 − eσ.
Claim 11.1. If e is a real random variable subjected to Gaussian of variance σ
2, then Pr[|e| >
10σ] < 2−70.
We can bound the last term eσ by the Claim 11.1. For other terms, we divide the 512
coefficients of the polynomial σ1 and σ2 into 64 groups by the same way in Section 11. From
Theorem 11.1, we only need to calculate the distribution of ‖(e2x1 − e1x2)k‖q,2 for every k.
We shall make use of the symmetry of multidimensional continual Gaussian to derive a simple
form of the distribution of ‖(e2x1 − e1x2)k‖2q,2, and then calculate the distribution numerically
by computer programs. One may assume n is large enough to use the central limit theorem. The
comparison of our numerical method result and the error probability obatined by central limit
theorem is shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Comparison of the probability estimated by our method and the error probability
obtained by central limit theorem.
Theorem 11.2. For two polynomials f(x), g(x) ∈ Zq[x]/(x512 + 1), we can represent f(x) as
f(x) = f0(x
64) + f1(x
64)x+ · · ·+ f63(x64)x63, where fi(x)(i = 0, 1, . . . , 63) are in R. g(x) can be
represented in the same way as g(x) = g0(x
64)+g1(x
64)x+· · ·+g63(x64)x63. Let h(x) = f(x)g(x),
and h(x) is represented as h(x) = h0(x
64) + h1(x
64)x+ · · ·+ h63(x64)x63. Then we have
hk(x) =
∑
i+j=k
fi(x)gj(x) +
∑
i+j=k+64
fi(x)gj(x)x (10)
Proof. We have f(x)g(x) =
∑
i,j fi(x
64)gj(x
64)xi+j . For each (i, j) such that i+ j < 64, the term
fi(x
64)gj(x
64) is added into hi+j(x
64). For each (i, j) such that i+j ≥ 64, we have i+j−64 < 64,
and fi(x
64)gj(x
64)xi+j = fi(x
64)gj(x
64)xi+j−64x64. Hence, the term fi(x64)gj(x64)x64 is added
into hi+j−64(x64). Now we derive hk(x64) =
∑
i+j=k fi(x
64)gj(x
64)+
∑
i+j=k+64 fi(x
64)gj(x
64)x64.
By applying Theorem 11.2 to the polynomial e2x1 − x2e1, we know that for every fixed k,
there are ai(x), bi(x) ∈ R, i = 1, 2, . . . , 128 whose coefficients are subjected to rounded Gaussian,
such that (e2x1 − x2e1)k =
∑128
i=1 ai(x)bi(x).
Theorem 11.3. If ai(x), bi(x), i = 1, 2, . . . , 128 are polynomials in KR whose coefficients are
drawn from continues Gaussian of variance σ2 independently, then the following two distributions
are identical.
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•
∥∥∥∑128i=1 ai(x)bi(x)∥∥∥2
2
, where the 2-norm here refers to treat the polynomials in KR as a vector
in R8, and take the 2-norm in R8.
• 4σ4∑4i=1 xiyi, where xi are drawn from chi-square distribution χ2(256) independently, and
yi are drawn from χ
2(2) independently.
To prove this theorem, we introduce the canonical embedding, which is a commonly used
tool in ideal lattice analysis. The canonical embedding σ is a map from KR to C8, defined as
σ(f) = (σi(f))i∈Z∗16 , where σi(f) = f(ω
i
16), and ω16 ∈ C is the root of equation x16− 1 = 0. Note
that σ(f) is essentially the Fourier transformation of the coefficients of the polynomial f . Let 
denote the component-wise multiplication over C8. Then σ is a ring homomorphism. In addition,
one half of σi is the complex conjugation of the other half, i.e. σi(f) = σ16−i(f). If we constrain
σ on the first half, i.e. (σi)i∈Z∗16,i≤8 ∈ C4, and regard C4 as a real space R8, then σ is a scaled
rotation.
Proof of Theorem 11.3. From the scaling property and the homomorphism property of σ, we have∥∥∥∥∥
128∑
i=1
ai(x)bi(x)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
1
8
∥∥∥∥∥σ
(
128∑
i=1
ai(x)bi(x)
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
1
8
∥∥∥∥∥
128∑
i=1
σ(ai) σ(bi)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
(11)
=
1
4
∑
j∈Z∗16,i≤8
∣∣∣∣∣
128∑
i=1
σj(ai) σj(bi)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(12)
The last equality comes from the complex conjugation property of σj . As σ is a rotation, it trans-
forms a Gaussian to a Gaussian. Hence, σj(ai), j ∈ Z∗16 are subjected to Gaussian of deviation
2σ, and are indepedent.
Then, conditioned on bi, i = 1...128,
∑128
i=1 σj(ai)  σj(bi) is subjected to a 2-dimensional
Gaussian of variance (2σ)2
∑128
i=1 |σj(bi)|2. This deviation is subjected to (2σ)4χ2(256). Note that
the Gaussian of variance (2σ)4χ2(256) can be generated by multiplying the standard deviation
to the standard Gaussian. Hence,
∣∣∣∑128i=1 σj(ai) σj(bi)∣∣∣2 is subjected to (2σ)4xjyj , where xj
are subjected to χ2(256) independently, and yj are the squared norm of the Gaussian, which are
subjected to χ2(2).
By Theorem 11.3, we only need to numerically calculate the distribution of
∑4
i=1 xiyi, where
xi’s are subjected to χ
2(256) and yi’s are taken from χ
2(2) independently.
We design a numerical algorithm to calculate the distribution. In detail, we use discretization
to transform the χ2-distribution into discrete distribution. Then we represent the discrete distri-
butions as dictionaries, which are denote as distr1, distr2 and distr in the following.
• discretization(m, s) outputs a dictionary that represent the distribution of sbχ2(m)/se.
• multiply(distr1, distr2) outputs a dictionary that represent the distribution of x · y, where
x is subjected to distribution distr1 and y is subjected to distribution distr2.
• add(distr1, distr2) outputs a dictionary that represent the distribution of x+ y, where x is
subjected to distribution distr1 and y is subjected to distribution distr2.
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• merge(distr, s) outputs a dictionary that represent the distribution of sbx/se, where x is
subjected to the discrete distribution distr. This subroutine is used to reduce the number
of entries in the dictionary distr, and thus speeds up the calculation.
This four subroutines are straightforwardly implemented. discretization need to uses the cumu-
lative function of the distribution of χ2. This function can be numerically calculated preciously
and is provided by many open libraries.
Algorithm 19 Calculate the distribution of
∑4
i=1 xiyi
1: distrχ2(256) ← discretization(256, 0.1)
2: distrχ2(2) ← discretization(2, 0.02)
3: distr ← multiply(distrχ2(2), distrχ2(256))
4: distr ← merge(distr, 4)
5: distr ← add(distr, distr)
6: distr ← add(distr, distr)
Theorem 11.4. Let distr be the distribution outputed by Algorithm 19. For every positive real
number T , Pr[
∑4
i=1 xiyi > T ] < Pr[distr > T − 64].
Proof. We analyze the errors of each of the four operations. multiply and add have no truncation
errors. For discretization and merge, we have |x− sbx/se| = s|x/s− bx/se| < s/2. Let edxi , edyi be
the errors produced by discretization, and emk be the errors produced by merge. Then we have∣∣∣∣∣
3∑
i=0
((xi + e
d
xi)(yi + e
d
yi) + e
m
k )−
3∑
i=0
xiyi
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
3∑
i=0
|edxi |yi + |edyi |xi + |edxiedyi |+ |emk |
In our Algorithm 19, we have |edyi | < 0.01 and |edxi | < 0.1. In addition, Pr[xi > 600] < 2−180 and
Pr[yi > 150] < 2
−190. So we can simply assume xi < 600 and yi < 150. Hence, the right hand
side is less than 4 · (600 · 0.01 + 150 · 0.05 + 0.01 · 0.05 + 2) < 64.
Claim 11.2. For n = 512, σ2 = 22, g = 26, the over all error probability of the scheme is less
than 2−58.
Proof. From Claim 11.1 and Theorem 11.1, we need to calculate the probability of ‖(e2x1 −
e1x2)k‖q,2 > (q − 1)/2 −
√
2(q/g − 1) − 10σ > 5824. From Theorem 11.3, this equals to the
probability of
∑3
i=0 xiyi > 5824
2/(4 · 222) = 17520. From Theorem 11.4, this probability is less
than Pr[distr > 17520− 64 = 17456]. The computer program numerically calculates Pr[distr >
17456] < 2−64.6. We use the union bound to derive the over all error probability is less than
64 · 2−64.6 < 2−58.
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A Consensus Mechanism of Frodo
Let the modulo q be power of 2, which can be generalized to arbitrary modulo using the techniques
in [Pei14]. Let integer B be a power of 2. B < (log q)− 1, B¯ = (log q)−B (note that m = 2B in
our notations). The underlying KC mechanism implicitly in Frodo is presented in Figure 20.
Algorithm 20 Key consensus scheme in Frodo
1: procedure Con(σ1, params) . σ1 ∈ [0, q)
2: v =
⌊
2−B¯+1σ1
⌋
mod 2
3: k1 =
⌊
2−B¯σ1
⌉
mod 2B
4: return (k1, v)
5: end procedure
6: procedure Rec(σ2, v, params) . σ2 ∈ [0, q)
7: find x ∈ Zq closest to σ2 s.t.
⌊
2−B¯+1x
⌋
mod 2 = v
8: k2 =
⌊
2−B¯x
⌉
mod 2B
9: return k2
10: end procedure
Claim A.1 ( [BCD+16], Claim 3.2). If |σ1 − σ2|q < 2B¯−2, then Rec(σ2, v) = k1. i.e. the scheme
in Algorithm 20 is correct.
This claim is equivalence to require 4md < q.
B Consensus Mechanism of NewHope
Note that, for the consensus mechanism of NewHope, the rec procedure is run both in Con and
in Rec, and a random bit b is used in Con corresponding to the dbl trick in [Pei14].
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Algorithm 21 NewHope Consensus Mechanism
1: procedure Decode(x ∈ R4/Z4) . Return a bit k such that kg is closest to x + Z4
2: v = x− bxe
3: return k = 0 if ‖v‖1 ≤ 1, and 1 otherwise
4: end procedure
5:
6: HelpRec(x, b) = CVPD˜4
(
2r
q (x + bg)
)
mod 2r . b corresponds to the dbl trick [Pei14]
7: rec
(
x ∈ Z4q ,v ∈ Z42r
)
= Decode
(
1
qx− 12rBv
)
8:
9: procedure Con(σ1 ∈ Z4q , params)
10: b← {0, 1}
11: v← HelpRec(σ1, b)
12: k1 ← rec(σ1,v)
13: return (k1,v)
14: end procedure
15:
16: procedure Rec(σ2 ∈ Z4q ,v ∈ Z42r , params)
17: k2 ← rec(σ2,v)
18: end procedure
19:
C Security Analysis of LWE-Based Key Exchange
Definition C.1. A KC or AKC based key exchange protocol from LWE is secure, if for any
sufficiently large security parameter λ and any PPT adversary A, ∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣ is negligible,
as defined w.r.t. game G0 specified in Algorithm 22.
Algorithm 22 Game G0
1: A← Zn×nq
2: X1,E1 ← χn×lA
3: Y1 = AX1 + E1
4: X2,E2 ← χn×lB
5: Y2 = A
TX2 + E2
6: Eσ ← χlA×lB
7: Σ2 = Y
T
1 X2 + Eσ
8:
(
K02,V
)← Con(Σ2, params)
9: K12 ← ZlA×lBm
10: b← {0, 1}
11: b′ ← A(A,Y1, bY2/2tc,Kb2,V)
Before starting to prove the security, we first recall some basic properties of the LWE assump-
tion. The following lemma is derived by a direct hybrid argument [PVW08,BCD+16].
Lemma C.1 (LWE in the matrix form). For positive integer parameters (λ, n, q ≥ 2, l, t), where
n, q, l, t all are polynomial in λ, and a distribution χ over Zq, denote by L
(l,t)
χ the distribution over
Zt×nq × Zt×lq generated by taking A ← Zt×nq ,S ← χn×l,E ← χt×l and outputting (A,AS + E).
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Then, under the standard LWE assumption on indistinguishability between Aq,s,χ (with s ← χn)
and U(Znq ×Zq), no PPT distinguisher D can distinguish, with non-negligible probability, between
the distribution L
(l,t)
χ and U(Zt×nq × Zt×lq ) for sufficiently large λ.
Theorem C.1. If (params,Con,Rec) is a correct and secure KC or AKC scheme, the key ex-
change protocol described in Figure 4 is secure under the (matrix form of) LWE assumption.
Proof. The proof is similar to, but actually simpler than, that in [Pei14, BCD+16]. The general
idea is that we construct a sequence of games: G0, G1 and G2, where G0 is the original game for
defining security. In every move from game Gi to Gi+1, 0 ≤ i ≤ 1, we change a little. All games
Gi’s share the same PPT adversary A, whose goal is to distinguish between the matrices chosen
uniformly at random and the matrices generated in the actual key exchange protocol. Denote by
Ti, 0 ≤ i ≤ 2, the event that b = b′ in Game Gi. Our goal is to prove that Pr[T0] < 1/2 + negl,
where negl is a negligible function in λ. For ease of readability, we re-produce game G0 below.
For presentation simplicity, in the subsequent analysis, we always assume the underlying KC or
AKC is correct. The proof can be trivially extended to the case that correctness holds with
overwhelming probability (i.e., failure occurs with negligible probability).
Algorithm 23 Game G0
1: A← Zn×nq
2: X1,E1 ← χn×lA
3: Y1 = AX1 + E1
4: X2,E2 ← χn×lB
5: Y2 = A
TX2 + E2
6: Eσ ← χlA×lB
7: Σ2 = Y
T
1 X2 + Eσ
8:
(
K02,V
)← Con(Σ2, params)
9: K12 ← ZlA×lBm
10: b← {0, 1}
11: b′ ← A(A,Y1, bY2/2tc,Kb2,V)
Algorithm 24 Game G1
1: A← Zn×nq
2: X1,E1 ← χn×lA
3: Y1 ← Zn×lAq
4: X2,E2 ← χn×lB
5: Y2 = A
TX2 + E2
6: Eσ ← χlA×lB
7: Σ2 = Y
T
1 X2 + Eσ
8:
(
K02,V
)← Con(Σ2, params)
9: K12 ← ZlA×lBm
10: b← {0, 1}
11: b′ ← A(A,Y1, bY2/2tc,Kb2,V)
Lemma C.2. |Pr[T0]−Pr[T1]| < negl, under the indistinguishability between L(lA,n)χ and U(Zn×nq ×
Zn×lAq ).
Proof. Construct a distinguisherD, in Algorithm 25, who tries to distinguish L(lA,n)χ from U(Zn×nq ×
Zn×lAq ).
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Algorithm 25 Distinguisher D
1: procedure D(A,B) . A ∈ Zn×nq ,B ∈ Zn×lAq
2: Y1 = B
3: X2,E2 ← χn×lB
4: Y2 = A
TX2 + E2
5: Eσ ← χlA×lB
6: Σ2 = Y
T
1 X2 + Eσ
7:
(
K02,V
)← Con(Σ2, params)
8: K12 ← ZlA×lBm
9: b← {0, 1}
10: b′ ← A(A,Y1, bY2/2tc,Kb2,V)
11: if b′ = b then
12: return 1
13: else
14: return 0
15: end if
16: end procedure
If (A,B) is subject to L
(lA,n)
χ , then D perfectly simulates G0. Hence, Pr
[
D
(
L
(lA,n)
χ
)
= 1
]
=
Pr[T0]. On the other hand, if (A,B) is chosen uniformly at random from Zn×nq ×Zn×lAq , which are
denoted as (AU ,BU ), then D perfectly simulates G1. So, Pr[D(AU ,BU ) = 1] = Pr[T1]. Hence,
|Pr[T0]− Pr[T1]| =
∣∣∣Pr[D(L(lA,n)χ ) = 1]− Pr[D(AU ,BU ) = 1]∣∣∣ < negl.
Algorithm 26 Game G1
1: A← Zn×nq
2: X1,E1 ← χn×lA
3: Y1 ← Zn×lAq
4: X2,E2 ← χn×lB
5: Y2 = A
TX2 + E2
6: Eσ ← χlA×lB
7: Σ2 = Y
T
1 X2 + Eσ
8:
(
K02,V
)← Con(Σ2, params)
9: K12 ← ZlA×lBm
10: b← {0, 1}
11: b′ ← A(A,Y1, bY2/2tc,Kb2,V)
Algorithm 27 Game G2
1: A← Zn×nq
2: X1,E1 ← χn×lA
3: Y1 ← Zn×lAq
4: X2,E2 ← χn×lB
5: Y2 ← Zn×lBq
6: Eσ ← χlA×lB
7: Σ2 ← ZlA×lBq
8:
(
K02,V
)← Con(Σ2, params)
9: K12 ← ZlA×lBm
10: b← {0, 1}
11: b′ ← A(A,Y1, bY2/2tc,Kb2,V)
Lemma C.3. |Pr[T1] − Pr[T2]| < negl, under the indistinguishability between L(lB ,n+lA)χ and
U(Z(n+lA)×nq × Z(n+lA)×lBq ).
Proof. As Y1 is subject to uniform distribution in G1, (Y
T
1 ,Σ2) can be regarded as an L
(lB ,lA)
χ
sample of secret X2 and noise Eσ. Based on this observation, we construct the following distin-
guisher D′.
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Algorithm 28 Distinguisher D′
1: procedure D′(A′,B) where A′ ∈ Z(n+lA)×nq ,B ∈ Z(n+lA)×lBq
2: Denote A′ =
(
AT
YT1
)
. A ∈ Zn×nq ,YT1 ∈ ZlA×nq
3: Denote B =
(
Y2
Σ2
)
. Y2 ∈ Zn×lBq ,Σ2 ∈ ZlA×lBq
4:
(
K02,V
)← Con(Σ2, params)
5: K12 ← ZlA×lBm
6: b← {0, 1}
7: b′ ← A(A,Y1, bY2/2tc,Kb2,V)
8: if b′ = b then
9: return 1
10: else
11: return 0
12: end if
13: end procedure
If (A′,B) is subject to L(lB ,n+lA)χ , A′ ← Z(n+lA)×nq corresponds to A← Zn×nq and Y1 ← Zn×lAq
in G1; and S← χn×lB (resp., E← χ(n+lA)×lB ) in generating (A′,B) corresponds to X2 ← χn×lB
(resp., E2 ← χn×lB and Eσ ← χlA×lB ) in G1. In this case, we have
B = A′S + E =
(
AT
YT1
)
X2 +
(
E2
Eσ
)
=
(
ATX2 + E2
YT1 X2 + Eσ
)
=
(
Y2
Σ2
)
Hence Pr
[
D′
(
L
(lB ,n+lA)
χ
)
= 1
]
= Pr[T1].
On the other hand, if (A′,B) is subject to uniform distribution U(Z(n+lA)×nq × Z(n+lA)×lBq ),
then A,Y1,Y2,Σ2 all are also uniformly random; So, the view of D′ in this case is the same
as that in game G2. Hence, Pr [D′ (A′,B) = 1] = Pr[T2] in this case. Then |Pr[T1] − Pr[T2]| =
|Pr[D′(L(lB ,n+lA)χ ) = 1]− Pr[D′(U(Z(n+lA)×nq × Z(n+lA)×lBq )) = 1]| < negl.
Lemma C.4. If the underlying KC or AKC is secure, Pr[T2] = 12 .
Proof. Note that, in Game G2, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ lA and 1 ≤ j ≤ lB,
(
K02[i, j],V[i, j]
)
only depends
on Σ2[i, j], and Σ2 is subject to uniform distribution. By the security of KC, we have that, for
each pair (i, j), K02[i, j] and V[i, j] are independent, and K
0
2[i, j] is uniform distributed. Hence,
K02 and V are independent, and K
0
2 is uniformly distributed, which implies that Pr[T2] = 1/2.
This finishes the proof of Theorem C.1.
D Construction and Analysis of AKCN-4:1
D.1 Overview of NewHope
By extending the technique of [PG13], in NewHope the coefficients of σ1 (i.e., the polynomial of
degree n) are divided into n/4 groups, where each group contains four coordinates. On the input
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of four coordinates, only one bit (rather than four bits) consensus is reached, which reduces the
error probability to about 2−61 which is viewed to be negligible in practice.
Specifically, suppose Alice and Bob have σ1 and σ2 in Z4q respectively, and they are close
to each other. One can regard the two vectors as elements in R4/Z4, by treating them as 1qσ1
and 1qσ2. Consider the matrix B = (u0,u1,u2,g) ∈ R4×4, where ui, 0 ≤ i ≤ 2, is the canonical
unit vector whose i-th coordinate is 1, and g = (1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2)T . Denote by D˜4 the lattice
generated by B. Note that Z4 ⊂ D˜4 ⊂ R4. Denote by V the close Voronoi cell of the origin in
D˜4. In fact, V is the intersection of the unit ball in norm 1 and the unit ball in infinity norm
(the reader is referred to NewHope [ADPS16, Appendix C] for details). The following procedure
CVPD˜4(x) returns the vector v such that Bv is closest to x, i.e., x ∈ Bv +V, where the distance
is measured in the Euclidean norm.
Algorithm 29 CVPD˜4 in NewHope [ADPS16]
1: procedure CVPD˜4(x ∈ R4)
2: v0 = bxe
3: v1 = bx− ge
4: k = 0 if ‖x− v0‖1 < 1 and 1 otherwise
5: (v0, v1, v2, v3)
T = vk
6: return v = (v0, v1, v2, k)
T + v3 · (−1,−1,−1, 2)T
7: end procedure
If σ1 is in the Voronoi cell of g, then the consensus bit is set to be 1, and 0 otherwise.
Hence, Alice finds the closest lattice vector of σ1 by running the CVPD˜4 procedure described in
Algorithm 29, and calculates their difference which is set to be the hint signal v. Upon receiving
v, Bob subtracts the difference from σ2. Since σ1 and σ2 are very close, the subtraction moves
1
qσ2 towards a lattice point in D˜4. Then Bob checks whether or not the point after the move
is in the Voronoi cell of g, and so the consensus is reached. Furthermore, to save bandwidth,
NewHope chooses an integer r, and discretizes the Voronoi cell of g to 24r blocks, so that only
4r bits are needed to transfer the hint information. To make the distribution of consensus bit
uniform, NewHope adds a small noise to σ1, similar to the dbl trick used in [Pei14]. The Con
and Rec procedures, distilled from NewHope, are presented in Algorithm 21 in Appendix B.
D.2 Construction and Analysis of AKCN-4:1
For any integer q and vector x = (x0, x1, x2, x3)
T ∈ Z4q , denote by ‖x‖q,1 the sum |x0|q + |x1|q +
|x2|q+|x3|q. For two vectors a = (a0, a1, a2, a3)T ,b = (b0, b1, b2, b3)T ∈ Z4, let a mod b denote the
vector (a0 mod b0, a1 mod b1, a2 mod b2, a3 mod b3)
T ∈ Z4. The scheme of AKCN-4:1 is presented
in Algorithm 30.
Compared with the consensus mechanism of NewHope presented in Appendix B, AKCN-4:1
can be simpler and computationally more efficient. In specific, the uniformly random bit b used in
NewHope (corresponding the dbl trick in [Pei14]) is eliminated with AKCN-4:1, which saves 256
(resp., 1024) random bits in total when reaching 256 (resp., 1024) consensus bits. In addition, as
k1, as well as k1(q + 1)g, can be offline computed and used (e.g., for encryption, in parallel with
the protocol run), AKCN-4:1 enjoys online/offline speeding-up and parallel computing.
Theorem D.1. If ‖σ1 − σ2‖q,1 < q
(
1− 1g
)
− 2, then the AKCN-4:1 scheme depicted in Algo-
rithm 30 is correct.
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Proof. Suppose v′ = CVPD˜4(g(σ1 + k1(q + 1)g)/q). Then, v = v
′ mod (g, g, g, 2g), and so
there exits θ = (θ0, θ1, θ2, θ3) ∈ Z4 such that v = v′ + g(θ0, θ1, θ2, 2θ3)T . From the formula
calculating v′, we know there exits  ∈ V, such that g(σ1 + k1(q + 1)g)/q =  + Bv′. Hence,
Bv′ = g(σ1 + k1(q + 1)g)/q − .
From the formula computing x in Rec, we have x = Bv/g − σ2/q = Bv′/g − σ2/q +
B(θ0, θ1, θ2, 2θ3)
T = k1g + k1g/q − /g + (σ1 − σ2)/q + B(θ0, θ1, θ2, 2θ3)T . Note that the last
term B(θ0, θ1, θ2, 2θ3)
T ∈ Z4, and in line 7 of Algorithm 30 we subtract bxe ∈ Z4 from x, so the
difference between x− bxe and k1g in norm 1 is no more than 2/q + 1/g + ‖σ1 − σ2‖q,1/q < 1.
Hence, k2 = k1.
Algorithm 30 AKCN-4:1
1: procedure Con(σ1 ∈ Z4q , k1 ∈ {0, 1}, params)
2: v = CVPD˜4(g(σ1 + k1(q + 1)g)/q) mod (g, g, g, 2g)
T
3: return v
4: end procedure
5: procedure Rec(σ2 ∈ Z4q ,v ∈ Z3g × Z2g, params)
6: x = Bv/g − σ2/q
7: return k2 = 0 if ‖x− bxe‖1 < 1, 1 otherwise.
8: end procedure
Theorem D.2. AKCN-4:1 depicted in Algorithm 30 is secure. Specifically, if σ1 is subject to
uniform distribution over Z4q, then v and k1 are independent.
Proof. Let y = (σ1 + k1(q + 1)g) mod q ∈ Z4q . First we prove that y is independent of k1, when
σ1 ← Z4q . Specifically, for arbitrary y˜ ∈ Z4q and arbitrary k˜1 ∈ {0, 1}, we want to prove that
Pr[y = y˜ | k1 = k˜1] = Pr[σ1 = (y˜ − k1(q + 1)g) mod q | k1 = k˜1] = 1/q4. Hence, y and k1 are
independent.
For simplicity, denote by G the vector (g, g, g, 2g). Map φ : Z4 → Z3g × Z2g is defined
by φ(w) = CVPD˜4(gw/q) mod G. We shall prove that, for any θ ∈ Z4, φ(w + qθ) = φ(w). By
definition of φ, φ(w+qθ) = CVPD˜4(gw/q+gθ) mod G. Taking x = gw/q+gθ into Algorithm 29,
we have CVPD˜4(gw/q + gθ) = CVPD˜4(gw/q) + B
−1(gθ). It is easy to check that the last term
B−1(gθ) always satisfies B−1(gθ) mod G = 0.
From the above property of φ, we have φ(y) = φ((σ1 + k1(q + 1)g) mod q) = φ(σ1 + k1(q +
1)g) = v. As k1 is independent of y, and v only depends on y, k1 and v are independent.
E Implementing HxT in SEC with Simple Bit Operations
uint16_t getCode(uint16_t x)
{
uint16_t c, p;
c = (x >> 4) ^ x;
c = (c >> 2) ^ c;
p = ((c >> 1) ^ c) & 1;
x = (x >> 8) ^ x;
c = (x >> 2) ^ x;
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p = (((c >> 1) ^ c) & 1) | (p << 1);
x = (x >> 4) ^ x;
p = (((x >> 1) ^ x) & 1) | (p << 1);
x = (x >> 2) ^ x;
p = (x & 1) | (p << 1);
return p;
}
Listing 1: An implementation of HxT with C language
F A Note on Lizard
We note that the CPA-secure PKE scheme, Lizard, proposed in [CKLS16] is actually instantiated
from our AKCN scheme presented in Algorithm 4, where the two close values are derived from
generating and exchanging spLWE and spLWR samples in an asymmetric way. Specifically, the
public key is generated with spLWE samples, while ciphertext is generated with spLWR samples.
However, the underlying AKC mechanism in the spLWE/spLWR based PKE scheme analyzed
in [CKLS16] is actually an instantiation of our AKCN scheme for the special case of m|g|q, where
g (resp., m) in AKCN corresponds to p (resp., t) in [CKLS16].
Let Xn,ρ,θ denote the set containing all n dimension vectors that have exactly θ non-zero
components, and each non-zero component is in {±1,±2, . . . ,±ρ}. spLWE problem is the LWE
problem whose secret vector is drawn uniformly randomly from the set Xn,ρ,θ.
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